Marruecos

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VIII RAN entre Marruecos y España:

La octava Reunión de Alto Nivel (RAN) entre Marruecos y España se celebrará el 5 y 6 de marzo próximos en Marruecos bajo la presidencia de los jefes de Gobierno de los dos países, Dris Jetu y José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, informó hoy el ministerio marroquí de Asuntos Exteriores. El comunicado del ministerio marroquí de Exteriores no precisa en qué ciudad se celebrará la RAN, aunque al parecer las ciudades de Casablanca y Rabat son las que cuentan con mayores posibilidades de acoger esta cumbre bilateral. El comunicado señala que la celebración de la RAN "confirma el carácter intenso, permanente y regular de los contactos establecidos a diferentes niveles entre los dos países".

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Chakib Benmussa, ministro del Interior marroquí:

P. A juzgar por las oleadas de detenciones, hay muchos marroquíes tentados por el terrorismo.

R. Intentamos poner énfasis en la anticipación en lugar de reprimir, pero sin caer en la paranoia. Diría que se trata de una labor de saneamiento. Golpeamos los focos en los que se propugna la violencia y se intenta adoctrinar a los jóvenes. Todas las detenciones se practican bajo control judicial. La semana pasada, anuncié en la reunión del Gobierno que elevábamos el nivel de alerta general. Es una manera de movilizar a los servicios de seguridad y de pedir a la población que tenga una actitud vigilante.

P. En Tetuán, de donde son originarios algunos de los presuntos autores del 11-M, hubo muchas detenciones.

R. Tetuán no es objeto de ninguna medida de seguridad especial. Es verdad que a finales de año desmantelamos una red que adoctrinaba a los jóvenes para enviarles a Irak. Una treintena habría logrado llegar hasta allí.

P. Además de las subvenciones públicas, los pilares de la economía de Ceuta y Melilla son, en buena medida, el contrabando y el blanqueo de dinero. ¿Suponen algún riesgo en materia de seguridad?

R. La economía sumergida, que predomina en ambos enclaves ocupados, estimula el desarrollo de redes mafiosas. El sector informal no puede ser el pilar de un sistema económico. Sé que es difícil, pero hay que tomar medidas para combatirlo.

P. ¿La cooperación policial hispano-marroquí ha mejorado después de los atentados de Casablanca y Madrid?

R. Es excelente y da frutos cada semana con el desmantelamiento de redes mafiosas, detenciones de presuntos terroristas y apresamientos de alijos de droga. Gracias a esta colaboración, hemos abortado numerosas operaciones delictivas en 2006.

P. ¿Podrán algún día los policías de ambos países trabajar juntos, como lo hacen desde hace años españoles y franceses en el suroeste de Francia para luchar contra ETA?

R. Ya lo hacen. No actúan codo con codo físicamente, pero su colaboración no consiste en un mero intercambio de datos. Se coordinan durante semanas, para desarrollar una investigación y desmantelar a un grupo mafioso.

P. Marruecos ha mejorado mucho el control de sus fronteras. ¿Le quedan aún progresos por hacer?

R. Desde 2004 hemos desmantelado 1.150 redes que traficaban con inmigrantes clandestinos y hemos detenido a miles de personas. Tenemos desplegados a 11.000 hombres dedicados a la vigilancia costera, lo que nos cuesta cien millones de euros al año. Los intentos de emigrar desde nuestras costas a España han caído un 60%. Ahora bien, no podemos quedarnos con los brazos cruzados porque las mafias buscan nuevos circuitos, inventan trucos. Pedimos ayuda a la UE, que nos prometió 70 millones de euros, pero no nos ha llegado aún un céntimo.

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DARÍO VALCÁRCEL: Subdirector de ‘ABC’ y fundador de ‘El País’. En sus artículos pone a Marruecos como modelo de régimen moderado en el Magreb y apoya las tesis marroquíes sobre el Sáhara Occidental.

Y director de la revista "Política Exterior"...

Respecto a Marruecos, mi opinión es cambiante

Líbano, hace que cambie cada poco, por ejemplo.

[KS]

El rey Mohamed VI de Marrruecos, padre de una niña

La princesa Lalla Salma, esposa del rey, dio a luz ayer tarde a la niña y ambas están en "perfecto estado de salud"

Se trata del segundo hijo del matrimonio, que ya tiene un niño, el príncipe heredero Moulay Hassan, nacido en 2003 y al que Mohamed VI impuso el nombre de su padre el rey Hasán II, fallecido en julio de 1999. Su hija se llamará como la madre de la princesa Lalla Salma, Lalla Jadiya.

Para celebrar el acontecimiento, se colocarán libros de oro en las sedes institucionales de las diferentes ciudades del país y en las embajadas de Marruecos en el exterior para recoger las felicitaciones


(Mohamed VI en una imagen de archivo del nacimiento de su primogénito, en mayo de 2003.)

Un saludo,
KS

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Islamist Infiltration of the Moroccan Armed Forces

By Matthew Chebatoris

At the end of July 2006, Moroccan authorities dismantled Ansar al-Mahdi, a previously unknown terrorist group, and made initial arrests of 44 people. The number of arrestees later grew to 56 and spanned multiple cities in northern Morocco. The group itself was unique and included an eclectic mix of drug traffickers, wives of Air Maroc pilots and members of the armed forces reportedly led by Hassan al-Khattab—a known Salafi-Jihadi aspirant who was imprisoned for two years in 2003 following the Casablanca bombings (La Gazette du Maroc, August 21, 2006; L'Expression, August 13, 2006). Unlike previous terror cells, which were predominantly comprised of members from the poor working class, appearances suggest this organization transcended social barriers in its quest to recruit members. Moreover, while Moroccan authorities have disrupted numerous terrorist cells in recent years, the disclosure that members of the Moroccan military had been recruited into a terror cell with the intent of conducting attacks against government and tourist targets in Morocco could signify a new stage in Morocco's efforts to combat the influence of radical Islamists.

Origins of Moroccan Salafism

Salafi-Jihadism, which was blamed by Moroccan authorities for the Casablanca bombings, is best characterized as an amorphous movement comprised of like-minded individuals who adhere to a radical interpretation of Salafism, which, in their eyes, sanctions violence. While the movement lacks an overarching command structure, the origins of Moroccan Salafism can be traced back to the network of Saudi-trained imams who discarded traditional apolitical Salafi beliefs in exchange for politically charged rhetoric and a willingness to engage in violence. Beginning in the 1960s, the government of King Hassan II began to encourage Islamists, particularly those from Saudi Arabia, as a natural bulwark against the pan-Arab social nationalist policies of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. Whatever skepticism Morocco may have had of Salafism, broader strategic considerations at the time—such as the relationship between Morocco and Saudi Arabia vis-à-vis the United States, and Saudi support for Morocco's conflict with Western Sahara—took precedent [1]. Many of the imams who were originally sanctioned by the Moroccan government set out to establish ad hoc mosques in the slums on the outskirts of Morocco's cities. It was here that their influence began to take hold among the poor and socially disenfranchised residents of the vast shantytowns known in Morocco as bidonvilles.

Prior Unrest in the Armed Forces

The Moroccan military has not always served as the guardian of the Moroccan crown. During the early 1970s, the military was involved in two failed coup attempts against King Hassan II, the father of Morocco's current ruler. In contrast to the current environment, these coup attempts were led by military officers and were not Islamist in nature. Moreover, they were directed solely at the regime and not the Moroccan public. The acknowledgement by Moroccan authorities that Ansar al-Mahdi had penetrated the ranks of the armed forces is the first time a threat of this nature has been admitted publicly and may be a sign of its seriousness.

There are conflicting reports surrounding the identities of the military members belonging to Ansar al-Mahdi. Most point toward the involvement of five soldiers deemed to have expertise in explosives (La Gazette du Maroc, August 14, 2006). L'Expression, an Algerian daily, claimed on August 13, 2006 that the soldiers were working at the airbase in Sale. Interestingly, a Western media outlet interviewed the family of Mohamed Khalouki, one of the five soldiers arrested, who claimed Mohamed and his four colleagues were merely members of the military band and had nothing to do with the alleged terror group (ABC News, September 29, 2006). Little more regarding the background of the soldiers has been publicly disclosed, giving scant insight into the depth that Salafi-Jihadi ideology has penetrated the armed forces. Fortunately, available information does not point toward the involvement of military officers in the terror cell, which would be an indicator of wide penetration as the officers are in a position to influence the lower ranks. Nor does information suggest the involvement of elite units, which could make their specialized skills and training available to radical Islamists.

The inclusion of military members in Ansar al-Mahdi is but one of the differences between this round of arrests and previous actions by the security services. While Moroccan authorities have disrupted Salafi-Jihadi cells in the past, the cells have lacked the structure of traditional terrorist organizations. Hassan al-Khattab's Ansar al-Mahdi, on the other hand, appears to have had a more traditional framework, possibly indicative of an evolution in the shape of Moroccan terror organizations, with the added muscle of military expertise to assist in the training of members. La Gazette du Maroc on August 14, 2006 characterized Ansar al-Mahdi as a military organization with separate members in charge of Islamist indoctrination and operations. Notably, al-Khattab appears to have built a hierarchical organization where members were not only aware of one another, but also worked together in a coordinated effort, which marks a contrast with the past shape of Salafi-Jihadism in Morocco.

Indeed, given Morocco's social inequalities and the susceptibility of low paid soldiers to corruption and outside influences, on the surface the armed forces give the appearance of an organization vulnerable to the influence of radical Islamists. Made up of three services (Army, Air Force and Navy), the Moroccan armed forces are comprised of roughly 196,000 active personnel, among which there are between 75,000-100,000 conscripts, and a reserve force of 150,000. The seemingly high number of conscripts is somewhat misleading since roughly 353,377 Moroccan men become eligible for the draft each year. Moreover, many voluntarily remain in the military where they have the ability to earn a steady, albeit low, monthly income comparable to Morocco's minimum monthly wage of $223.30.

Implications for the Future

As of late January 2007, the trials of al-Khattab and Ansar al-Mahdi members have been postponed until appropriate legal representation can be agreed upon for all defendants. While officials have disclosed few details on the extent of the Islamist infiltration, the actions taken by the Moroccan government in the wake of the Ansar al-Mahdi arrests provide observers with the most telling signs as to the seriousness of the Islamist threat vis-à-vis the armed forces. On August 31, 2006, the government ended conscription in the armed forces, a move undoubtedly aimed at mitigating the vulnerability of the lower ranks to the influence of radical Islamists. Young men aged 18 were previously required to enter military service for a compulsory period of 18 months. Most were deployed to serve in Western Sahara—which is territorially administered by Morocco—in what has become an increasingly unpopular policy decision by Rabat and desertions were not uncommon. The end of mandatory service, however, was but one of the wide-sweeping changes felt across the Moroccan security services. Changes also occurred at the top of the ranks with the dismissal of General Hamidou Laanigri, head of the General Office of National Security (Direction Generale de la Surete Nationale, DGSN), and General Mohammed Belbachir, head of the Military Intelligence Service (Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, DST) (Le Journal Hebdomadaire, September 23-29, 2006). Furthermore, the palace relieved 12 lower officials, predominantly from regional elements of the various security services, of their duties. Notably, many were replaced by civilians with personal ties to the king (La Gazette du Maroc, September 18, 2006).

This far reaching purge of the security services suggests the degree of Islamist infiltration has perhaps been greater than previously disclosed by the Moroccan government. Nevertheless, it remains unlikely that units of the armed forces have been co-opted to the extent that they have the ability or the popular support to overthrow the Moroccan government and establish an Islamic state as witnessed during the Iranian revolution. The move to an all volunteer force is a positive step and should have the effect of reducing the appeal of radical Islamic ideology in the military by removing the most susceptible layer from the ranks. Ending conscription is unlikely to significantly impact manning levels in the armed forces and will allow the kingdom to focus on developing all-volunteer, professional military services. Morocco's official unemployment rate is a mere 7.7 percent; however, this calls into question the level of "underemployment" across the kingdom. As a result, the benefit of a steady monthly income offered by the armed forces will likely remain appealing to many young Moroccan men. From a purely security perspective, while Algeria remains a regional rival, Morocco does not face an external military threat to its security that would necessitate the need for mandatory military service. Additionally, a permanent resolution of the dispute over Western Sahara would likely serve to alleviate some of the strain on the armed forces and boost morale.

In many ways, the Casablanca bombings served as a wake up call for the Moroccan government, which has begun to take measures to alleviate the socio-economic pressures affecting the majority of Moroccans. Importantly, the demographic makeup of Ansar al-Mahdi appears to have eroded the often held belief that socio-economic pressures alone are driving Morocco's internal Islamist movement. Despite the violence of the Casablanca bombings in May 2003, Morocco does not have a history of Islamic terrorism. In contrast to other North African countries, such as Algeria and Egypt, Morocco has remained relatively immune from the plagues of violence. The kingdom's ability to incorporate democratic reforms and not allow security concerns to drive all facets of government policy will prove to be crucial in combating the future threat of terrorism in Morocco.

Many of the changes related to the recent events are transparent to ordinary Moroccans and have not resulted in an overtly large security presence in popular tourist areas such as the Djemma al-Fna in Marrakesh. Additionally, despite the implication of wives of Air Maroc pilots, airport security is not at a heightened level [2]. The recent reorganization of the security services is an important step toward dismantling the powerful makhzen (governing elite), who have remained influential in guiding Moroccan politics during Mohammed VI's reign. In addition to these changes, continuing efforts must be made to improve the prospects of those in the lower echelons of the armed forces in order to mitigate the ideological influence of radical Islamists and maintain the honor of an important institution.

Notes

1. Howe, Marvine, Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges, Oxford University Press: New York, 2005.
2. Observations by the author from November 2006 travel to Marrakesh, Ouarzazate and Zagora.

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VIII Cumbre hispano-marroquí

http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2007/03/0 ... 1173091966

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Las legislativas se celebrarán en Marruecos el 7 de septiembre.

-el 47% de los marroquíes se inclinan, según dos sondeos publicados en 2006, por votar al PJD.

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Marruecos y la emprsa rusa Atomstroyexport, están dialogando para la adquisición de una central nuclear para producir electricidad y construirla en Sidi Boulbra, a 400 km de Lanzarote.

-La delegación rusa llegó ayer a Rabat y hoy le toca ir a Sidi Boulbra.
-Todos los grupos parlamentarios canarios están en desacuerdo con el proyecto de Marruecos.

Hay que recordar que los marroquíes querían construir una en la zona de Tan Tan a 200 km de Lanzarote. La zona es peligrosa por sus altos movimientos sísmicos.

[KS]

Algunos comentarios al respecto:

- La empresa Atomstroyexport si los marroquíes pagan construirá la central, y dará igual cualquier presión que pueda hacer España o la UE. No se han amilanado un pelo en seguir incluso hoy en día la construcción de la central de Busherh, Irán, a pesar de todas las amenazas y presiones de Estados Unidos.

- Mas info sobre la compañía: www.atomstroyexport.ru

- Información sobre el modelo de reactor que se construiría, el VVER-1000:
http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/VVER

Un saludo,
KS

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Los chinos se han fijado en Marruecos:

-Han designado a Marruecos como uno de sus nueve países prioritarios, a los que concederá ventajas fiscales, ademá de incentivos a las empresas chinas que participen en el sector petrolero y gasístico marroquí.

-Cooperarán en las telecomunicaciones, agricultura, pesca, infraestructuras (incluyendo centrales energéticas), además del petróleo ygas, infraestr

-Además del país norteafricano, figuran en la lista Bolivia, Ecuador, Libia, Kuwait, Níger, Noruega, Qatar y Omán. Las principales petroleras chinas operan en la mayoría de las naciones que forman la nueva lista.

Pekín y Rabat quieren impulsar al mismo tiempo los intercambios comerciales, que en 2005 crecieron un 28%, hasta alcanzar 1.480 millones de dólares (1.100 millones de euros). Marruecos es uno de los principales importadores de té chino, y compra a su socio oriental textiles, equipos mecánicos y electrónica. China, por su parte, adquiere fertilizantes químicos y materias primas, como fosfatos y arena de cobalto.

Fuente: El País