PRISM

Espacio dedicado a explotar los documentos publicados por diferentes medios de prensa a través de las filtraciones de Edward Snowden.
Zigor
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Re: PRISM

Mensaje por Zigor » 21 Ago 2013 13:41

Sí bueno, el zas en toda la boca por su ley antihomosexual ya se lo ha llevado Rusia con el beso de las dos atletas en el podio del campeonato, es una mera cuestión doméstica, en otros países, incluido el nuestro, también estaba mal visto salir del armario, y no hace tantos años de eso; una cuestión puramente doméstica, es científico estimar que un porcentaje de los seres humanos tiene una orientación sexual diferente a la heterosexual cualquiera que sea la comunidad o la nacionalidad, en ese aspecto todo lo que publicite que una sociedad o comunidad es sólo heterosexual que se lo crea el que quiera, Rusia se dará cuenta de eso antes o después, le vendrá desde dentro.

Ahora bien, vamos al robo de datos de una agencia de inteligencia, sinceramente te digo que si no ya a agencias que considero más lejanas y que encima aunque las veamos como amigas en un momento dado vuelve a brotar Gibraltar y tenemos que darnos cuenta de que no son tan amiguitos nuestros sino que cada uno tiene que salvar su propio culo, que aguanten su vela, sino también agencias mucho más cercanas, incluso con las que yo pudiera tener un cierto grado de compenetración o integrtación (o meramente interés, porque es obvio que como ciudadano español aun si ni siquiera yo me hubiera implicado alguna vez en una labor amiga con ellos, el CNI o la división de Información de la Ertzaintza velan por mies intereses) si la información que destapa la prensa, sea como fuere el método de haberla conseguido, destapa irregularidades, ilegalidades, crímenes, habría que estudiar cada caso, pero me parecería perfecto. Otra cuestión es que se desvelase información operativa en la que los servicios de inteligencia en el desarrollo correcto de sus funciones se puedan ver comprometidos, pero si es para pillarles en un renuncio, estoy a favor de la transparencia. Es decir por poner un ejemplo apoyo plenamente la labor de lso periodistas de Diario 16 que desvelaron la realidad del GAL, y de que se desvelase la realidad del GAL verde también, y mira que se trataba de desvelar la labor de un honorable alto mando de la Guardia Civil famoso por su importante y precisa lucha contra ETA, pero se pasaron bastante con algunas cosas, asesinaron como lo hacían los terroristas que combatían, fueron tan ineptos como organización qeu además produjeron numerosos daños a gente que no estaba relacionada con los crímenes de ETA en absoluto. Si me preguntas por aquello, sí, estoy plenamente a favor de esa labor periodística. Aquellos periodistas no trabajaban con información robada, tenemos ahí el matiz, trabajaban con información procedente de integrantes arrepentidos del GAL, o más tarde de rebotados. tampoco veo que sea muy diferenter aquella forma de obtener la información, dichos integrantes robaban esa información a su matriz, el GAL, rompiendo el secreto con ella, y la entregaron a los periodistas.

recuerdo que a Obama todo este asunto le ha forzado a salir a decir que sí, que igual hay que dotar de mayor transparencia a las acciones de los servicios, en tanto a obtención de información indiscriminada.

Y sí, es obvio que el FSB está muy interesado en lo que tiene Snowden, y conocemos cómo ha empezado a pagarle. Yo también estaría interesado como estado si ahí hay información de espionaje a ciudadanos de mi país indiscriminadamente o contra los intereses de mi país. trabajamos todavía con el concepto de países de primera y de segunda, y ese chip está cambiando con la globalización.

la parte que le alabo a Obama es cuando dice que hay medios para denunciar irregularidades dentro de las propias estructuras, pero en la práctica para lo que sabemos que sirve, vete a denunciar a alguien de la familia Real española ante la justicia española si ha cometido una irregularidad, y te darás cuenta de que igual la denuncia la tienes que poner por medio de la prensa nacional e internacional y por las redes sociales.

Estoy seguro de que todo ésto son formas de verlo, pero sin duda alguna, puedo distinguir respecto de una venta de información por parte del traidor Flórez a Rusia y una denuncia pública de cosas feas que hace un servicio de inteligencia, aunque dado el elevado volumen de información sustraida, reconozco que ambas cosas se mezclan.

Recordais ahora cuando estábamos frotándonos las manos por las filtraciones del SEBIN (en USA se estarían frotando mucho más que nosotros) y resulta que al poco sale lo de Snowden. A mi apreciado amigo kilo009, con quien muchas veces mantengo por aquí diferencias importantes de opinión, ya le vi realizar una reflexión muy seria sobre la no conveniencia de airear demasiado cierta información con respecto a lo del SEBIN, en el clima de euforia que muchos teníamos en este foro por ejemplo, dado que la vuelta a algo como eso es que un día te lo hacen a tí también y te tienes que callar porque has aplaudido cuando se lo han hecho a otros.

No voy a descartar que las motivaciones de Snowden fueran económicas más que de conciencia, yo me puedo creer lo segundo por las informaciones que recibo, pero desde luego no conozco al tipo, ya me gustaría entrevistarme con él, sin duda. lograr una entrevista con Snowden de parte de este foro sería una buena, eh? ;)

Un abrazo, compañeros foristas
".............Jakitea irabazteko............."
JO TA KE, SUGEA ZAPALDU ARTE !!!

Zigor
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Re: PRISM

Mensaje por Zigor » 25 Ago 2013 13:55

Dicen en el foro de Wikileaks que la NSA no sabe exactamente todo lo que les robó Snowden debido a su habilidad para no dejar rastros digitales. Creo que está también el tema que decíais de que hay demasiada gente habilitada por el aumento de necesidades de personal en esta y otras agencias a partir del 11S, pero aún así, y yendo a ser crítico, mosca cojonera y abogado del diablo (lo siento, es mi línea) me queda el sabor de boca de que estamos hablando del ordenador de la contabilidad de "Frutas Loli" y no de los sistemas informáticos de una Agencia de Inteligencia o Seguridad, y del país más poderoso de la tierra... igual hasta le podían volver a contratar a Snowden para que les diga todos los truños que tienen en sus sistemas.

http://www.wikileaks-forum.com/index.php?topic=22016.0
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Re: PRISM

Mensaje por Mod. 4 » 29 Ago 2013 21:47

Como comenté hace unas semanas, si el FSB no ha estado detrás desde el principio, desde luego han sabido hacerse con el control de Wikileaks:

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/b876a8bc035a

La semana que viene podré poner unas cuantas informaciones sobre este asunto, incluyendo datos sobre el espionaje específico a ONU y UE, y a los fallos que permitieron a Snowden sacar toda la documentación sin ser detectado.

Saludos.

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Re: PRISM

Mensaje por kilo009 » 30 Ago 2013 18:07

Muy buena información la que contiene el ‘black budget’ summary:

Información complementaria:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/sp ... ck-budget/


U.S. spy agencies have built an intelligence-gathering colossus since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, but remain unable to provide critical information to the president on a range of national security threats, according to the government’s top-secret budget.

The $52.6 billion “black budget” for fiscal 2013, obtained by The Washington Post from former ­intelligence contractor Edward Snowden, maps a bureaucratic and operational landscape that has never been subject to public scrutiny. Although the government has annually released its overall level of intelligence spending since 2007, it has not divulged how it uses the money or how it performs against the goals set by the president and Congress.

The 178-page budget summary for the National Intelligence Program details the successes, failures and objectives of the 16 spy agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community, which has 107,035 employees.

The summary describes cutting-edge technologies, agent recruiting and ongoing operations. The Post is withholding some information after consultation with U.S. officials who expressed concerns about the risk to intelligence sources and methods. Sensitive details are so pervasive in the documents that The Post is publishing only summary tables and charts online.

“The United States has made a considerable investment in the Intelligence Community since the terror attacks of 9/11, a time which includes wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arab Spring, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technology, and asymmetric threats in such areas as cyber-warfare,” Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. wrote in response to inquiries from The Post.

“Our budgets are classified as they could provide insight for foreign intelligence services to discern our top national priorities, capabilities and sources and methods that allow us to obtain information to counter threats,” he said.

Among the notable revelations in the budget summary:

●Spending by the CIA has surged past that of every other spy agency, with $14.7 billion in requested funding for 2013. The figure vastly exceeds outside estimates and is nearly 50 percent above that of the National Security Agency, which conducts eavesdropping operations and has long been considered the behemoth of the community.

●The CIA and the NSA have begun aggressive new efforts to hack into foreign computer networks to steal information or sabotage enemy systems, embracing what the budget refers to as “offensive cyber operations.”

●Long before Snowden’s leaks, the U.S. intelligence community worried about “anomalous behavior” by employees and contractors with access to classified material. The NSA planned to ward off a “potential insider compromise of sensitive information” by re-investigating at least 4,000 people this year who hold high-level security clearances.

●U.S. intelligence officials take an active interest in friends as well as foes. Pakistan is described in detail as an “intractable target,” and counterintelligence operations “are strategically focused against [the] priority targets of China, Russia, Iran, Cuba and Israel.” The latter is a U.S. ally but has a history of espionage attempts against the United States.

●In words, deeds and dollars, intelligence agencies remain fixed on terrorism as the gravest threat to national security, which is listed first among five “mission ob­jectives.” Counterterrorism programs employ one in four members of the intelligence workforce and account for one-third of the intelligence program’s spending.

●The governments of Iran, China and Russia are difficult to penetrate, but North Korea’s may be the most opaque. There are five “critical” gaps in U.S. intelligence about Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs, and analysts know virtually nothing about the intentions of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

Formally known as the Congressional Budget Justification for the National Intelligence Program, the “top-secret” blueprint represents spending levels proposed to the House and Senate intelligence committees in February 2012. Congress may have made changes before the fiscal year began on Oct 1. Clapper is expected to release the actual total spending figure after the fiscal year ends on Sept. 30.

The document describes a constellation of spy agencies that track millions of surveillance targets and carry out operations that include hundreds of lethal strikes. They are organized around five priorities: combating terrorism, stopping the spread of nuclear and other unconventional weapons, warning U.S. leaders about critical events overseas, defending against foreign espionage, and conducting cyber-operations.

In an introduction, Clapper said the threats facing the United States “virtually defy rank-ordering.” He warned of “hard choices” as the intelligence community — sometimes referred to as the “IC” — seeks to rein in spending after a decade of often double-digit budget increases.

The current budget proposal envisions that spending will remain roughly level through 2017 and amounts to a case against substantial cuts.

“Never before has the IC been called upon to master such complexity and so many issues in such a resource-constrained environment,” Clapper wrote.

An espionage empire

The summary provides a detailed look at how the U.S. intelligence community has been reconfigured by the massive infusion of resources that followed the 2001 attacks. The United States has spent more than $500 billion on intelligence during that period, an outlay that U.S. officials say has succeeded in its main objective: preventing another catastrophic terrorist attack in the United States.

The result is an espionage empire with resources and a reach beyond those of any adversary, sustained even now by spending that rivals or exceeds the levels at the height of the Cold War.

The current total budget request was 2.4 percent below that of fiscal 2012. In constant dollars, it was about twice the estimated size of the 2001 budget and 25 percent above that of 2006, five years into what was then known as the “global war on terror.”

Historical data on U.S. intelligence spending is largely nonexistent. Through extrapolation, experts have estimated that Cold War spending probably peaked in the late 1980s at an amount that would be the equivalent of $71 billion today.

Spending in the most recent cycle surpassed that amount, based on the $52.6 billion detailed in documents obtained by The Post plus a separate $23 billion devoted to intelligence programs that more directly support the U.S. military.

Lee H. Hamilton, an Indiana Democrat who chaired the House Intelligence Committee and co-chaired the commission that investigated the Sept. 11 attacks, said that access to budget details will enable an informed public debate on intelligence spending for the first time, much as Snowden’s disclosures of NSA surveillance programs brought attention to operations that had assembled data on nearly every U.S. citizen.

“Much of the work that the intelligence community does has a profound impact on the life of ordinary Americans, and they ought not to be excluded from the process,” Hamilton said.

“Nobody is arguing that we should be so transparent as to create dangers for the country,” he said. But, he added, “there is a mind-set in the national security community: ‘Leave it to us, we can handle it, the American people have to trust us.’ They carry it to quite an extraordinary length so that they have resisted over a period of decades transparency. . . . The burden of persuasion as to keeping something secret should be on the intelligence community, the burden should not be on the American public.”

Experts said that access to such details about U.S. spy programs is without precedent.

“It was a titanic struggle just to get the top-line budget number disclosed, and that has only been done consistently since 2007,” said Steven Aftergood, an expert at the Federation of American Scientists, a Washington-based organization that provides analyses of national security issues. “But a real grasp of the structure and operations of the intelligence bureaucracy has been totally beyond public reach. This kind of material, even on a historical basis, has simply not been available.”

The only meaningful frame of reference came in 1994, when a congressional subcommittee inadvertently published a partial breakdown of the National Intelligence Program. At the time, the CIA accounted for just $4.8 billion of a budget that totaled $43.4 billion in 2012 dollars. The NSA and the National Reconnaissance Office, which operates satellites and other sensors, commanded far larger shares of U.S. intelligence budgets until years after the Cold War ended.

During the past decade, they have taken a back seat to the CIA.

The NSA was in line to receive $10.5 billion in 2013, and the NRO was to get $10.3 billion — both far below the CIA, whose share had surged to 28 percent of the total budget.

Overall, the U.S. government spends 10 times as much on the Defense Department as it does on spy agencies.

“Today’s world is as fluid and unstable as it has been in the past half century,” Clapper said in his statement to The Post. “Even with stepped up spending on the IC over the past decade, the United States currently spends less than one percent of GDP on the Intelligence Community.”

Dominant position

The CIA’s dominant position is likely to stun outside experts. It represents a remarkable recovery for an agency that seemed poised to lose power and prestige after acknowledging intelligence failures leading up to the 2001 attacks and the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.

The surge in resources for the agency funded secret prisons, a controversial interrogation program, the deployment of lethal drones and a huge expansion of its counterterrorism center. The agency was transformed from a spy service struggling to emerge from the Cold War into a paramilitary force.

The CIA has devoted billions of dollars to recruiting and training a new generation of case officers, with the workforce growing from about 17,000 a decade ago to 21,575 this year.

The agency’s budget allocates $2.3 billion for human intelligence operations and $2.5 billion to cover the cost of supporting the security, logistics and other needs of those missions around the world. A relatively small amount of that total, $68.6 million, was earmarked for creating and maintaining “cover,” the false identities employed by operatives overseas.

There is no specific entry for the CIA’s fleet of armed drones in the budget summary, but a broad line item hints at the dimensions of the agency’s expanded paramilitary role, providing more than $2.6 billion for “covert action programs” that would include drone operations in Pakistan and Yemen, payments to militias in Afghanistan and Africa, and attempts to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program.

The black budget illuminates for the first time the intelligence burden of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. For 2013, U.S. spy agencies were projected to spend $4.9 billion on “overseas contingency operations.” The CIA accounted for about half of that figure, a sum factored into its overall $14.7 billion budget.

Those war expenditures are projected to shrink as the United States withdraws forces from Afghanistan. The budget also indicates that the intelligence community has cut the number of contractors it hires over the past five years by about 30 percent.

Critical gaps

Despite the vast outlays, the budget blueprint catalogues persistent and in some cases critical blind spots.

Throughout the document, U.S. spy agencies attempt to rate their efforts in tables akin to report cards, generally citing progress but often acknowledging that only a fraction of their questions could be answered — even on the community’s foremost priority, counterterrorism.

In 2011, the budget assessment says intelligence agencies made at least “moderate progress” on 38 of their 50 top counterterrorism gaps, the term used to describe blind spots. Several concern Lebanon’s Hezbollah movement, an enemy of Israel that has not attacked U.S. interests directly since the 1990s.

Other blank spots include questions about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear components when they are being transported, the capabilities of China’s next-generation fighter aircraft, and how Russia’s government leaders are likely to respond to “potentially destabilizing events in Moscow, such as large protests and terrorist attacks.”

A chart outlining efforts to address key questions on biological and chemical weapons is particularly bleak. U.S. agencies set annual goals for at least five categories of intelligence collection related to these weapons. In 2011, the agencies made headway on just two gaps; a year earlier, the mark was zero.

The documents describe expanded efforts to “collect on Russian chemical warfare countermeasures” and assess the security of biological and chemical laboratories in Pakistan.

A table of “critical” gaps listed five for North Korea, more than for any other country that has pursued or is pursuing a nuclear bomb.

The intelligence community seems particularly daunted by the emergence of “homegrown” terrorists who plan attacks in the United States without direct support or instruction from abroad, a threat realized this year, after the budget was submitted, in twin bombings at the Boston Marathon.

The National Counterterrorism Center has convened dozens of analysts from other agencies in attempts to identify “indicators” that could help law enforcement officials understand the path from religious extremism to violence. The FBI was in line for funding to increase the number of agents who surreptitiously track activity on jihadist Web sites.

But a year before the bombings in Boston, the search for meaningful insight into the stages of radicalization was described as one of the “more challenging intelligence gaps.”

High-tech surveillance

The documents make clear that U.S. spy agencies’ long-standing reliance on technology remains intact. If anything, their dependence on high-tech surveillance systems to fill gaps in human intelligence has intensified.

A section on North Korea indicates that the United States has all but surrounded the nuclear-armed country with surveillance platforms. Distant ground sensors monitor seismic activity and scan the country for signs that might point to construction of new nuclear sites. U.S. agencies seek to capture photos, air ­samples and infrared imagery “around the clock.”

In Iran, new surveillance techniques and technologies have enabled analysts to identify suspected nuclear sites that had not been detected in satellite images, according to the document.

In Syria, NSA listening posts were able to monitor unencrypted communications among senior military officials at the outset of the civil war there, a vulnerability that President Bashar al-Assad’s forces apparently later recognized. One of the NRO’s functions is to extract data from sensors placed on the ground near suspected illicit weapons sites in Syria and other countries.

Across this catalogue of technical prowess, one category is ­depicted as particularly indis­pensable: signals intelligence, or SIGINT.

The NSA’s ability to monitor e-mails, phone calls and Internet traffic has come under new scrutiny in recent months as a result of disclosures by Snowden, who worked as a contract computer specialist for the agency before stockpiling secret documents and then fleeing, first to Hong Kong and then Moscow.

The NSA was projected to spend $48.6 million on research projects to assist in “coping with information overload,” an occupational hazard as the volumes of intake have increased sharply from fiber-optic cables and Silicon Valley Internet providers.

The agency’s ability to monitor the communications of al-Qaeda operatives is described in the documents as “often the best and only means to compromise seemingly intractable targets.”

Signals intercepts also have been used to direct the flight paths of drones, gather clues to the composition of North Korea’s leadership and evaluate the response plans of Russia’s government in the event of a terrorist attack in Moscow.

The resources devoted to signals intercepts are extraordinary.

Nearly 35,000 employees are listed under a category called the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, which includes the NSA as well as the surveillance and code-breaking components of the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marines.

The NSA is planning high-risk covert missions, a lesser-known part of its work, to plant what it calls “tailored radio frequency solutions” — close-in sensors to intercept communications that do not pass through global networks.

Even the CIA devotes $1.7 billion, or nearly 12 percent of its budget, to technical collection efforts, including a joint program with the NSA called “CLANSIG,” a covert program to intercept radio and telephone communications from hostile territory.

The agency also is pursuing tracking systems “that minimize or eliminate the need for physical access and enable deep concealment operations against hard targets.”

The CIA has deployed new biometric sensors to confirm the identities and locations of al-
Qaeda operatives. The system has been used in the CIA’s drone campaign.

Spending on satellite systems and almost every other category of collection is projected to shrink or remain stagnant in coming years, as Washington grapples with budget cuts across the government. But the 2013 intelligence budget called for increased investment in SIGINT.

Counterintelligence

The budget includes a lengthy section on funding for counterintelligence programs designed to protect against the danger posed by foreign intelligence services as well as betrayals from within the U.S. spy ranks.

The document describes programs to “mitigate insider threats by trusted insiders who seek to exploit their authorized access to sensitive information to harm U.S. interests.”

The agencies had budgeted for a major counterintelligence initiative in fiscal 2012, but most of those resources were diverted to an all-hands emergency response to successive floods of classified data released by the anti-secrecy group WikiLeaks.

For this year, the budget promised a renewed “focus . . . on safeguarding classified networks” and a strict “review of high-risk, high-gain applicants and contractors” — the young, nontraditional computer coders with the skills the NSA needed.

Among them was Snowden, then a 29-year-old contract computer specialist whom the NSA trained to circumvent computer network security. He was copying thousands of highly classified documents at an NSA facility in Hawaii, and preparing to leak them, as the agency embarked on the new security sweep.

“NSA will initiate a minimum of 4,000 periodic reinvestigations of potential insider compromise of sensitive information,” according to the budget, scanning its systems for “anomalies and alerts.”

Julie Tate contributed to this report.


http://m.washingtonpost.com/world/natio ... story.html
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Mod. 4
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Re: PRISM

Mensaje por Mod. 4 » 06 Sep 2013 10:44

How Snowden did it

By Richard Esposito and Matthew Cole escribió:When Edward Snowden stole the crown jewels of the National Security Agency, he didn’t need to use any sophisticated devices or software or go around any computer firewall.

All he needed, said multiple intelligence community sources, was a few thumb drives and the willingness to exploit a gaping hole in an antiquated security system to rummage at will through the NSA’s servers and take 20,000 documents without leaving a trace.

“It’s 2013 and the NSA is stuck in 2003 technology,” said an intelligence official.

Jason Healey, a former cyber-security official in the Bush Administration, said the Defense Department and the NSA have “frittered away years” trying to catch up to the security technology and practices used in private industry. “The DoD and especially NSA are known for awesome cyber security, but this seems somewhat misplaced,” said Healey, now a cyber expert at the Atlantic Council. “They are great at some sophisticated tasks but oddly bad at many of the simplest.”

As a Honolulu-based employee of Booz Allen Hamilton doing contract work for the NSA, Snowden had access to the NSA servers via "thin client" computer. The outdated set-up meant that he had direct access to the NSA servers at headquarters in Ft. Meade, Md., 5,000 miles away.

In a “thin client” system, each remote computer is essentially a glorified monitor, with most of the computing power in the central server. The individual computers tend to be assigned to specific individuals, and access for most users can be limited to specific types of files based on a user profile.

But Snowden was not most users. A typical NSA worker has a “top secret” security clearance, which gives access to most, but not all, classified information. Snowden also had the enhanced privileges of a “system administrator.” The NSA, which has as many as 40,000 employees, has 1,000 system administrators, most of them contractors.

As a system administrator, Snowden was allowed to look at any file he wanted, and his actions were largely unaudited. “At certain levels, you are the audit,” said an intelligence official.

He was also able to access NSAnet, the agency’s intranet, without leaving any signature, said a person briefed on the postmortem of Snowden’s theft. He was essentially a “ghost user,” said the source, making it difficult to trace when he signed on or what files he accessed.

If he wanted, he would even have been able to pose as any other user with access to NSAnet, said the source.

The “thin client” system and system administrator job description also provided Snowden with a possible cover for using thumb drives.

The system is intentionally closed off from the outside world, and most users are not allowed to remove information from the server and copy it onto any kind of storage device. This physical isolation – which creates a so-called “air gap" between the NSA intranet and the public internet -- is supposed to ensure that classified information is not taken off premises.

But a system administrator has the right to copy, to take information from one computer and move it to another. If his supervisor had caught him downloading files, Snowden could, for example, have claimed he was using a thumb drive to move information to correct a corrupted user profile.

“He was an authorized air gap,” said an intelligence official.

Finally, Snowden’s physical location worked to his advantage. In a contractor’s office 5,000 miles and six time zones from headquarters, he was free from prying eyes. Much of his workday occurred after the masses at Ft. Meade had already gone home for dinner. Had he been in Maryland, someone who couldn’t audit his activities electronically still might have noticed his use of thumb drives.

It’s not yet certain when Snowden began exploiting the gaps in NSA security. Snowden worked for Booz Allen Hamilton for less than three months, and says he took the job in order to have access to documents. But he may have begun taking documents many months before that, while working with the NSA via a different firm. According to Reuters, U.S. officials said he downloaded documents in April 2012, while working for Dell.

Snowden is thought to have made his initial attempt to offer documents to the media in late 2012, while at Dell. According to published accounts, he tried to contact Guardian journalist Glenn Greenwald in December and started talking to filmmaker Laura Poitras in January.

He began working for Booz Allen in March. In May, he told his supervisor he needed to take time off to deal with a health issue, and then flew to Hong Kong, where he met with Poitras and Greenwald, on May 20. He later told the Guardian that he was downloading documents on his last day at work. The revelations based on his documents started appearing in the Guardian and the Washington Post within weeks.

Snowden is currently living in Russia, where he’s been granted temporary asylum. The U.S. government has charged him with theft and violations of the Espionage Act.

U.S. intelligence officials said recently that they plan to significantly reduce the number of individuals with system administrator privileges.

“U.S. intelligence has invited so many people into the secret realm,” said an intelligence official. “There are potentially tons of Edward Snowdens. But most people aren’t willing to vacuum everything up and break the law.”

The NSA did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Mal proceso de asignación de habilitaciones TS/SCI, ausencia de supervisores o un par que pudiera detectar el saqueo de datos, darle las llaves al tipo equivocado, diferencia horaria...

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Re: PRISM

Mensaje por kilo009 » 11 Sep 2013 10:38

Declassified FISA court documents on intelligence collection

http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/w ... ction/447/

Declassified court documents highlight NSA violations in data collection for surveillance
http://m.washingtonpost.com/world/natio ... story.html
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Re: PRISM

Mensaje por Mod. 4 » 19 Sep 2013 15:50

NSA reveals how Snowden accessed secret Prism files

The NSA plans to introduce a “two-man” rule to remove anonymity from its network by ensuring no one with privileged access to its network is ever unsupervised.

The NSA also plans to mark sensitive documents and data with identifiers that will limit access to those who need to see the documents and who are authorised by NSA leadership to view them. The tagging will also allow supervisors to see what individuals do with the data they see and handle.


El problema de la segunda medida de seguridad es que el etiquetado de contenidos es muy pesado, y el de usuarios ya puede ser una tortura.

Zigor
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Re: PRISM

Mensaje por Zigor » 20 Sep 2013 00:37

Lo del "two-man" me gusta, para aplicarlo también a las actividades de Inteligencia en sí, que tengan supervisión, para evitar el que se lleven a cabo actividades con otros fines que la seguridad nacional, o de acción indiscriminada. Básicamente para que se cumplan las leyes por parte de los SI también, que todo ésto ha reabierto el debate de cuándo y hasta dónde se puede espiar, y sobre todo, con qué justificación racional.
".............Jakitea irabazteko............."
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Re: PRISM

Mensaje por Zigor » 27 Oct 2013 11:23

Un poco off-topic pero no sabía dónde ubicarlo, es una mera anécdota relacionada con la temática de las filtraciones. Estos días atrás una persona me comentaba que un amigo le había confesado disponer de unas informaciones que salpicarían a alguna personalidad local del mundo de la política, a las que había tenido acceso con motivo de su trabajo, y que estaba muy tentado a airearlas, pero que no lo hacía porque estaba viendo que la sociedad no se merece algo que no se está ganando con su inmovilismo ante la grave situaciónd e crisis económica, moral y de corrupción. Me dejó planchado jajajaja, yo que le iba a animar a que filtrara ;)
".............Jakitea irabazteko............."
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kilo009
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Re: PRISM

Mensaje por kilo009 » 06 Nov 2013 16:20

Creo que es el mayor documento que he visto sobre la NSA http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world ... l?hp&_r=5&
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