Atacada la central nuclear de Pelindaba

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Atacada la central nuclear de Pelindaba

Mensaje por Loopster » 09 Nov 2007 22:26

Atacada la central nuclear de Pelindaba (Sudáfrica)


Attack at Pelindaba nuclear facility
9 November 2007, 07:17


A brazen attack by four gunmen on the Pelindaba nuclear facility has left a senior emergency officer seriously injured.

Anton Gerber, Necsa emergency services operational officer spoke to the Pretoria News from his hospital bed hours after the attack.

He was shot in the chest when the gunmen stormed the facility's emergency response control room in the early hours of Thursday morning.

The shooting comes four months after Necsa's newly appointed services general manager Eric Lerata, 43, was gunned down in front of his Montana home after returning from a business trip in France.

Pelindaba is regarded as one of the country's most secure national key points.

It is surrounded by electric fencing, has 24-hour CCTV surveillance, security guards and security controls and checkpoints.

The attack comes as the country prepares to preside over an International Atomic Energy Agency convention on nuclear safety.

The convention is aimed at achieving a high level of global nuclear safety via safety related technical co-operation; establishing and maintaining effective defences in nuclear installations against potential radiological hazards and preventing accidents with radiological consequences.

A visibly shaken Gerber, who was rushed to Eugene Marais hospital, on Thursday said that he was sitting in the control room with his fiancée Ria Meiring when he heard a loud bang.

Meiring, who was working nightshift, is the supervisor of the control room.

Gerber said he kept Meiring company. "I do not like it when she is at work at night and I go with her to keep her company and ensure that she is safe," he said.

Describing the attack Gerber said they were inside the electronically sealed control room when they heard a loud bang.

They then spotted the gunmen coming into the facility's eastern block.

It is believed that the attackers gained access to the building by using a ladder from Pelindaba's fire brigade and scaling a wall.

The men are thought to have forced open a window by pulling out several louvers.

Pushing Meiring underneath a desk, Gerber attacked two of the gunmen as they forced their way into the control room and ran straight for the control panel.

"I did not know what they were going to do. I just kept on hitting them even when one of them attacked me with a screwdriver.

"I knew that if I stopped they would attack Ria or do something to the panel.

"I could not let anything like that happen," he said.

Unbeknownst to Gerber one of the robbers had shot him in the chest as he fought them off.

The bullet narrowly missed his heart breaking a rib before puncturing his lung. Doctors said the bullet missed his spine by 2cm.

Gerber, who at one stage thought he was going to die, said he had been very scared.

"The facility is meant to be safe. There are security guards, electric fences and security control points. These things are not meant to happen," he said.

Necsa spokesperson Chantal Janneker confirmed the attack.

She declined to say how the gunmen had gained access to the facility or whether they had stolen anything.

Janneker said Necsa was conducting an internal investigation into the attack.

Once the police investigation was complete Necsa would divulge what happened, she said.

Later in the afternoon, Pretoria News was phoned by a man identifying himself as a Necsa legal adviser, saying the newspaper will be breaching the National Keypoints Act by publishing the story.

He said that Necsa may seek a court order preventing dissemination of the story.

He claimed that the interview with Gerber was "unethical" as "he was under sedation and thus incoherent" when it was conducted.

Pretoria News sought and was granted permission to interview Gerber, by hospital management, and Gerber himself. While he was obviously in pain, he appeared coherent and made sense throughout the interview.

His recall of the events was sequential and to the point. He also agreed to have his picture taken in his hospital bed.

North West police spokesperson Superintendent Louis Jacobs said that no arrests had been made.

"A case of armed robbery and attempted murder are being investigated," he said.


http://www.pretorianews.co.za/?fSectionId=&fArticleId=vn20071109061218448C528585
Cry havoc and unleash the hawgs of war - Otatsiihtaissiiststakio piksi makamo ta psswia

KS

Mensaje por KS » 10 Nov 2007 14:16

Esto es lo que los sudafricanos tienen en Pelindaba, hay muchas cosas jugosas para robar, vender, o hacer estallar:


* Safari-1 - 20MW swimming pool research reactor which has been under IAEA safeguards since its commissioning in 1965.

* Safari-2 / Pelinduna -- Critical assembly; closed and dismantled in 1970.

* Hot Cell Complex - The modern hot-cell complex is equipped to handle high levels of radioactivity. Dedicated in 1998 to commercial production of Molybdenum99, used for diagnostic treatment world-wide, from the Safari-1 reactor. Molybdenum-99 is produced in a number of other countries, but production capabilities are generally small and sporadically run.

* Z-plant - Semi-commercial, Helikon aerodynamic process enrichment plant produced 3.25 % enriched LEU for the Koeberg power station. This large (300 000 SWU/a) semi-commercial enrichment plant was constructed in the later 1970's and early 1980's, and commissioning commenced in 1984 and full production in 1988. Closed in 1995, the enrichment technology was less than novel and hopelessly uneconomic. The cavernous production hall with its countless vortex separators, more than any other AEC venture, embodied a "can do" rather than "should do" operation, driven by a government political mandate.

* UF6 Conversion Plant - The Conversion Plant started operation in 1986 and produced distilled uranium hexafluoride as from 1987/8. It was built to supply the AEC’s Z-Plant enrichment facility, which became operational in 1988. The conversion plant’s capacity exceeded the feed rate required for the Z-Plant, and conversion services have also been exported. Since 1995/96 this plant had undergone successful upgrading to solve certain bottle-necks towards achieving its full throughput of 1200 tpa and later expansion to 1500 tpa of uranium (U) as uranium hexafluoride (UF6). However, faced with a rapidly deteriorating market environment, this plant was closed in 1998. During almost two decades of operation, the UF6 Conversion Plant had served as a springboard for a wide array of fluorine and fluoride-based industrial projects within the AEC.

* BEVA Plant - The equipment was used in the pelletising and assembly sections of the process for the manufacturing of pressurised water reactor (PWR) LEU fuel elements for the Koeberg nuclear power reactor. BEVA production started in 1988 and average production has been about 25 tonnes of contained uranium per annum. Despite the AEC’s mandate to secure an indigenous nuclear fuel source for Koeberg, it supplied less than half of the plant’s requirements; Eskom was always able to secure fuel from abroad at lower costs. The plant was closed in 1995, and in August 1998 the Atomic Energy Corporation announced that it was seeking offers to purchase the redundant nuclear fuel fabrication equipment. The existing buildings and infrastructure housing the equipment were said to be potentially suitable for pebble-bed reactor fuel manufacture by Eskom, the national electricity supplier of South Africa. Eskom's new pebble-bed reactor project will use fuel of an entirely different type from that of the Koeberg PWRs and will consequently require completely new equipment in the manufacturing process.

* Zirconium Tubing Plant - Produced cladding for fuel assemblies used in Koeberg reactors. Closed in 1993, the plant's equipment was sold to the People's Republic of China in 1997. The plant, which had cost about R200 million to build, was sold for about R20 million.
* HEU-UF6 Production Plant

* Thabana Hill / Radiation Hill - Storage of spent fuel from Safari-1 and other radioactive waste.

* Building 1200 - Medical unit, converted to the Wildlife Breeding Research Centre (WBRC) headquarters and laboratory in March 1996.

* Building 1600 - Radioanalysis - A center of excellence for the measurement of nuclear radiation, with a staff of more than thirty scientists and analysts.

* Building 1900 - Reactor Theory -- comprehensive Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) and Materials Testing Reactor (MTR) core analysis.

* Building 5000 - Criticality experiments in the late 1970s; closed in the early 1980s.

* Calibration Laboratory - Inspection, repair, maintenance and calibration of instrumentation use for monitoring radiation and contamination.
* Isotope Centre - Provides products and services which rely on radiopharmaceuticals to improve the diagnosis and treatment of illness. The Isotope Centre also offers support services which include the disposal of waste, specialist advice and assistance in the design of hot laboratories.
* Flosep - Gas/solid vortex tube separation systems are one of the AEC's foremost technologies, arising originally from the uranium enrichment program. Flosep specialises in the design, including fluid dynamic studies, and manufacture of air filtration and dust control systems. Applications range from the reduction of stack emissions and other dust suppression projects to the recovery of fine product and filtration of ventilation air. Industrial applications include systems for compressors, winder motor cooling, substations and general ventilation.
* Fabritech - This specialised fabrication facility produces complex plant components in sophisticated materials for demanding service environments, including pressure vessels, heat exchangers and associated plant equipment in Aluminium, Stainless Steels, Duplex steels, Monel, Inconel, Titanium and other high alloys. Total area under cover is 7 700m2, with a total clean area under cover of 1,350m2.
* Pelchem - The chemical division of Pelindaba Technology was established in April 1999 to commercialise the technologies and products developed in the past for the nuclear fuel cycle. Initial products included hydrogen fluoride (HF), fluorine (F2), UF4 and UF6. Two new chemical plants are situated at Pelindaba, which provide tungsten hexafluoride (WF6) and chlorine trifluoride (CIF3) specifically for use in the semiconductor industry.
* Special Alloys Division - The Division renders metallurgical services, produces special alloys, undertakes heat treatment, welding, brazing and casting of materials with surface properties such as corrosion, wear and erosion resistance, or low friction.
* Specialised Plating Technology Division - Comprehensive cleaning and surface finishing services include surface treatment consulting, general plating, plating of noble metals and specialised plating.
* FTP Toolcoat Division - Modification of polymer surfaces using fluorine or fluorine gas mixtures.
* Vacuum Service Division - Maintenance on a variety of vacuum equipment including vane, piston, diffusion, turbo and roots vacuum pumps and helium detectors.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world ... indaba.htm

pagano
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Mensaje por pagano » 10 Nov 2007 14:35

Allí es donde el anterior régimen surafricano fabricó las 6 bombas nucleares que tenía en su estocaje (se supone que además fabricó al menos otra más que fue probada). El presidente Botha, justo antes de entregar el poder tras el proceso electoral limpio (multirracial) declaró que el armamento nuclear nacional había sido totalmente desmantelado.

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Mensaje por kilo009 » 10 Nov 2007 15:01

Curiosamente, la UCYCO Central de la Comisaría General de Policía Judicial, junto con la CIA, mantiene investigaciones conjuntas contra el tráfico de material nuclear. Esto salió en un comunicado de prensa del Ministerio del Interior, con motivo de la visita del Director General de la Policía y la Guardia Civil a EEUU para entrevistarse con los máximos mandatarios de la seguridad estadounidense.

http://intelpage.info/forum/viewtopic.p ... 3&start=10
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Mensaje por Loopster » 14 Nov 2007 17:42

Más info sobre los ataques (si, en plural). Al parecer los asaltantes emplearon no solo tácticas militares durante su asalto a las instalaciones, sino que se conocían al dedillo la central, sabían lo que buscaban y emplearon equipos muy sofisticados para burlar la seguridad y llegar a donde quisieron.


http://www.thetimes.co.za/News/Article.aspx?id=612324

The Times - South Africa escribió:Six suspended after military-style gang launches attack on two fronts.



Six security officials at Pelindaba have been suspended from duty following a military- style attack on the nuclear facility west of Pretoria last week.

Officials of the SA Nuclear Energy Corporation yesterday said they believed the raid — during which an attempt was made to seize a computer — bore the hallmarks of “technically sophisticated criminals” with knowledge of the facility’s security systems.


The corporation’s chief executive officer, Rob Adam, said of the suspended officials: “We are not saying they are suspects, but their own systems are being investigated and it is best for them to be temporarily isolated from those systems.”

The question that remains is what the gang was after.

A computer was removed from an office near a control room but was abandoned at the facility as the gang escaped.

The Nuclear Energy Corporation has not disclosed whether information was copied from the computer or what kind of information was stored on it.

At first, it was thought that only four armed men had entered the Pelindaba property, but yesterday it emerged that a second group had been involved.

The corporation said the events early last Thursday were as follows:


12.16am: Four armed men gain access to the facility by cutting through an electrified perimeter fence. They deactivate security “layers” on the fence to prevent an alarm being triggered in the security control centre. Guards are unaware of the gang’s presence.


1am: A patrolling guard spots another group of intruders on the western side of the facility. Shots are fired and this group flees without gaining access.


Shortly after 1am: The first group of four breaks into the facility and removes a computer from an office near the emergency control centre. They enter the control room. A fight breaks out between them and station commander Anton Gerber. Gerber is shot in the chest but is able to alert other security personnel.


1.15am: The gang flees, apparently empty-handed, leaving behind the computer they tried to take. It is found on a balcony near the control room.


The police are alerted and a search gets under way involving police officers, police dogs, security personnel and a helicopter.


3am: Adam is told of the break-in by telephone and arrives at the facility 25 minutes later.


Adam said yesterday that he thought the attack must have been co-ordinated but he would not definitively link the two breaches.


Adam was at great pains to explain that at no time were any of the nuclear installations compromised. He said that each facility on the site had its own security measures.

He refused to suggest a motive for the attack .

“I find it as puzzling as you do,” he said.

Though closed-circuit television picked up the men entering the site, they were not seen by the security personnel. Adam said this would be investigated, as would the possibility that some security staff might have been asleep.

He said the attackers’ faces could not be clearly seen on the CCTV recording.

Asked if he had been told to present a report on the intrusion to the minister of defence, or the presidency, Adam would say only: “I have had relevant discussions with my principals.”

A reward of R25000 is being offered for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the raiders, and R10000 for the identification of anyone proved to have been involved in the raid.

A National Intelligence Agency source confirmed that because Pelindaba is a national key point it will be involved in the investigation of the attack.

A spokesman on nuclear issues for Earthlife Africa, Mahile Phalane, said he was not surprised by the security breaches.

He said: “It is shameful that there is such a lack of security at Pelindaba. I t is easy for anyone wearing overalls to walk onto the property and gain access ,” he told The Times.

“Whether it’s a lack of training or a complacent attitude towards security, if there were to be a [successful] major security breach it could mean disaster for the communities around Pelindaba, as well as for the environment.

“The fact that these men could so easily gain access is frightening,” he said.

Cry havoc and unleash the hawgs of war - Otatsiihtaissiiststakio piksi makamo ta psswia

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