Terrorismo islámico en la India.

Estudio del fenómeno yihadista en Pakistán, Afganistán, Chechenia, las repúblicas exsoviéticas y las conexiones de sus células en los Balcanes y el Reino Unido.
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Mensaje por gato »

Bueno, parece que hay implicaciones del LeT, el grupo terrorista islamista que ya atentó en 2001 contra el parlamento. Detrás de éste están varios sectores del ISI. El ISI suele volverse contra el poder político de Pakistán cuando este trata de controlarlo. Sin ir más lejos, la guerra de Kargil, lanzada por Musharraf con el apoyo del ISI fue una maniobra unilateral contra el entonces gobierno democrático, y acabó con un golpe de estado dirigido por el propio Musharraf.

Si un sector del ISI ha teledirigido este ataque, está claro que pretenden darle una patada en el trasero a su gobierno. ¿Tendrá algo que ver que en círculos talibanes de la FATA se está especulando con una nueva tregua con el Ejército Pakistaní y que alguno de sus mandos habría definido a líderes talibanes como "patriotas paquistaníes...?
La curiosidad mató al gato.

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Similitud entre Mombay y NY en el 93

Mensaje por chuski »

Aqui os dejo las similitudes entre el atentado de la India y el que se abortó en Manhattan en 1993.
On the surface, last week’s attack on Mumbai was remarkable for its execution and apparently unconventional tactics. But when compared to a plot uncovered 15 years ago that targeted prominent hotels in Manhattan, it becomes apparent that the Mumbai attack was not so original after all.

The 1993 New York Landmarks Plot
In July 1993, U.S. counterterrorism agents arrested eight individuals later convicted of plotting an elaborate, multistage attack on key sites in Manhattan. The militants, who were linked to Osama bin Laden’s then-relatively new group, al Qaeda, planned to storm the island armed with automatic rifles, grenades and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In multiple raids on key targets combined with diversionary attacks, they aimed to kill as many people as possible.

The planned attack, which came to be known as the “Landmarks” plot, called for several tactical teams to raid sites such as the Waldorf-Astoria, St. Regis and U.N. Plaza hotels, the Lincoln and Holland tunnels, and a midtown Manhattan waterfront heliport servicing business executives and VIPs traveling from lower Manhattan to various New York-area airports. The militants carried out extensive surveillance both inside and outside the target hotels using human probes, hand-drawn maps and video surveillance. Detailed notes were taken on the layout and design of the buildings, with stairwells, ballrooms, security cameras and personnel all reconnoitered.

The attackers intended to infiltrate the hotels and disguise themselves as kitchen employees. On the day of the attack, one attack team planned to use stolen delivery vans to get close to the hotels, at which point heavily armed, small-cell commando teams would deploy from the rear of the van. Stationary operatives would use hand grenades to create diversions while attack teams would rake hotel guests with automatic weapons. The attackers planned to carry gas masks and use tear gas in hotel ballrooms to gain an advantage over any security they might come up against. They planned to attack at night, when the level of protection would be lower.

The targeted hotels host some of the most prestigious guests in Manhattan. These could have included diplomats like the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, who traditionally keeps an apartment in the Waldorf-Astoria, or even the U.S. secretary of state, who is known to stay at the Waldorf during U.N. sessions. They also host various business leaders. If successful, the attackers doubtless would have killed many high-profile individuals key to New York’s stature as a center for financial and diplomatic dealings.

Meanwhile, the plots to detonate explosives in the Lincoln and Holland tunnels would have blocked critical transportation infrastructure, sowing chaos in the city as key escape routes were closed off. And VIPs seeking to escape the city via the midtown heliport would have been thwarted by the attack planned for that location. In fact, the heliport attack was planned to be carried out using watercraft, which also could have been used to target transport ferries, further disrupting transportation in and out of Manhattan. The New York City Police Department could plausibly even have quarantined Manhattan to prevent the attackers from fleeing the city.

With the city shut down and gunmen running amok, the financial center of the United States would have been thrown into chaos and confusion until the attackers were detained or killed. The attacks thus would have undermined the security and effectiveness of New York as a center for financial and diplomatic dealings.

At the time, U.S. counterterrorism officials deemed that the attack would have had a 90 percent success rate. Disaster, then, was averted when federal agents captured the plotters planning the Landmarks attack thanks to an informant who had infiltrated the group. Along with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing just four months earlier, which killed six people but was intended to bring down both towers, the United States dodged a major bullet that could have been devastating to New York.

The Nov. 26 Mumbai Attack
A little more than fifteen years later, the Nov. 26 attacks in Mumbai closely followed the script of the New York plot. Militants armed with AK-47s, grenades and military-grade explosives carried out a very logistically sophisticated and coordinated attack on the financial capital of India.

Clearly, the Mumbai attack involved extensive preoperational surveillance. Attackers had maps of the targeted hotels, and according to the Indian Marine Commandos who raided the Taj Mahal hotel, the militants moved around as if they knew the hotel’s layout by heart. Advance members of the attack teams had already taken up positions in the hotels, stockpiling firearms, ammunition, grenades and food that were quickly accessed and used to maintain the attackers’ positions in the hotels. One of the attackers reportedly also had taken a job as an intern chef in the Taj Mahal hotel kitchen, so his movements raised less suspicion and he had a detailed knowledge of the entry points and corridors. For such attacks, preparedness is key, and escaping alive is a long shot. The attackers therefore must have been highly motivated and willing to die — a rare combination that requires immense amounts of training and ideological zeal.

At least two teams entered the city by watercraft, breaking up into smaller groups as they made their way to the Taj Mahal hotel, Oberoi-Trident hotel complex and Nariman (also known as Chabad) House, a Jewish center in the same area of Mumbai. These tactical teams dispersed across the city, attacking prominent sites where foreign VIPs were sure to be present. They infiltrated the hotels through back entrances and kitchens, thus enhancing the element of surprise as they opened fire on guests in the dining areas and atriums of the hotels.

Beyond killing people and holding hostages in Mumbai’s most prestigious hotels, other attack teams assaulted additional strategic sites in Mumbai, creating a sense of chaos and confusion over the whole city. Mumbai’s main train station, Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, as well as Cama Hospital, offices of The Times of India newspaper, restaurants, a theater, and bars frequented by foreigners also were attacked. The attackers’ excellent coordination — the multiple attacks took place nearly simultaneously — thus ensured maximum confusion and chaos, frustrating police responses. This could explain in part why operations like those at Nariman House and the hotels lasted for more than 48 hours.

Similarities between New York and Mumbai
The similarities between the Landmarks plot and the Nov. 26 Mumbai attack are quite obvious. In symbolic terms, as the Mumbai attack unfolded, many onlookers said that an attack on Mumbai is to India what an attack on New York is to Americans. In more concrete terms, the targets, methods, weapons and geography involved were similar (if not identical), and the unconventional style of the attacks points to a common author.

U.S. counterterrorism forces in 1995 detained Landmarks plot mastermind Ramzi Yousef, who remains in U.S. federal prison. But his ideas obviously did not stay behind bars. This illustrates how a plan’s initial failure does not mean the threat has been eliminated. Indeed, Stratfor observed in 2005 that the 1993 Landmarks plot (among others) should not be discounted, as al Qaeda or other terrorist groups are known to return to past targets and plot scenarios.

The similarities between the Landmarks plot and the Mumbai attack exist at several levels.

The first relates to the target set. Both New York and Mumbai are the respective financial centers of their countries and home to their nations’ major stock exchanges. In both cities, the planners had picked out high-profile soft targets — sites that have less security personnel and countermeasures than, say, a military installation or key government building. Softer security means gaining access to strategic assets and people is easier. Stratfor has long stressed the importance of maintaining vigilance at soft targets like hote ls that cater to international guests, as these are likely targets for militant Islamists. Both plans also involved infiltrating hotel staff and booking rooms in the hotels to gain inside information and store supplies.

The second similarity involves how both plans included peripheral targets to cause confusion and chaos and thus create a diversion from the main targets. In Mumbai, transportation infrastructure like the city’s main railway station was attacked, and militants detonated explosive devices in taxis and next to gasoline pumps. Meanwhile, roving gunmen attacked other sites around the city. In a country where coordination among first responders is already weak, the way the attackers fanned out across the city caused massive chaos and distracted security forces from the main prize: the hotels. Attacking Cama Hospital also sowed chaos, as the injured from one scene of attack became the targets of another while being rescued.

A third similarity exists in the geography of the two cities. In both plots, the use of watercraft is a distinctive tactical similarity. Watercraft gave militants access at unconventional locations where security would be more lax. Both Mumbai (a peninsula) and Manhattan (an island) offer plenty of points where militants can mount assaults from watercraft. Such an attack would not have worked in New Delhi or Bangalore; these are landlocked cities where militants would have had to enter by road, a route much more likely to encounter police patrols. Being centers of trade and surrounded by water, both Mumbai and New York have high levels of maritime traffic. This means infiltrating the area from the water would raise minimal suspicions, especially if the craft were registered locally (as was the case in the Mumbai attack). Such out-of-the box tactics take advantage of security services, which often tend to focus on established threats.

A fourth similarity lies in transportation. In addition to using watercraft, both plots involved the use of deceptive vehicles to maneuver around the city undetected. The Landmark plotters used taxis to conduct surveillance and planned on using a delivery van to approach the hotels. In Mumbai, the attackers planted bombs in taxis, and at least one group of militants hijacked a police van and used it to carry out attacks across the city. Using familiar vehicles like taxis, delivery vans or police vans to carry out surveillance or attacks reduces suspicion and increases the element of surprise, allowing militants to stay under cover until the moment of attack.

An Off-the-Shelf Plan
As indicated, the striking similarities between the Landmarks plot and the Mumbai attack suggest that Ramzi Yousef and other early al Qaeda operatives who helped prepare the Landmarks plot in New York authored the Mumbai plan. Considering that the militants launched their original attack from Karachi, Pakistan, and the previous involvement of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency — which has connections with al Qaeda leaders in western Pakistan — it is very likely that al Qaeda in Pakistan at least provided the blueprints for this attack. On-the-ground operations like training, surveillance and the actual attack appear to have been carried out by the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba in connection with Indian Islamist groups.

Here we see more evidence of the existence of an ideological or strategic battle space that exists in the radical Islamist world, which has been greatly influenced by al Qaeda. Like a contingency plan that might sit on the shelf for years or decades before it is useful, terrorist plots (especially good ones) can have a long shelf life and be applied in various scenarios. In fact, plans that sit on the shelf longer might actually be more effective as security officials focus their attention on evolving threats and forget old ones.

Just because a plot has been disrupted, the threat has not been eliminated. Once terrorists happen upon a successful model, they are likely to follow that model. This can be seen in al Qaeda’s return to the World Trade Center in 2001, eight years after the initial truck bomb attacks in 1993. It can also be seen in the fact that Mumbai has been the target of multiple attacks and threats, including train bombings in 2006 that killed approximately 200 people. Though the tactics might have differed, the target set remained the same. Various parts of the attack cycle can change, but rarely does an attack occur that is completely novel.

Ultimately, the biggest difference between the Landmarks plot and the Mumbai attack is that the Mumbai attack succeeded. The failure of the Landmarks plot probably provided key lessons to the planners of the Mumbai attack, who were able to carry out the stages of the attack without detection and with the full element of surprise. Gauging by the success of the Mumbai incident, we can expect similar strategies and tactics in future attacks.

Un saludo


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Mensaje por cartledge »

Hablando de Al Qaeda en la India aquí hay un análisis de José Luís Calvo. El enlace es www.athenaintelligence.org/a132008.pdf

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Mensaje por Nemesis »

Muchachos, el lider de LeT ha concedido una entrevista. Juzguen y vean

Interview with Prof Hafiz Mohammad Saeed

Saturday 6 December 2008


At first sight – Prof Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the founder of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and currently the ameer of the Jamaatul Daawa (JuD) is an academician - jovial man who wears an easy smile on his face and, invariably, a Turkish cap on his head. A shalwar kameez-clad man, thoroughly Eastern in dress and habit, he is friendly and humble towards those who listen carefully to him. He is probably a person whose only introduction to the world of cosmetics has been the henna that is regularly applied to his long beard - a regular feature on a regular face in this part of the world. At first sight - it is a face that hardly begs for the camera. Look closer - it is a face that shies away from cameras as a rule. It has good reason to: Islam, the much un-photographed man says, forbids the capture of human images. Human lives, however, are another matter.

His favourite verse is: Wajahidu Fee Sabilallah: Wage a holy war in the name of God Almighty. His worldview is straight and simple: ’God has ordained every Muslim to fight until His rule is established,’ he says. ’We have no option but to follow God’s order.’ The Professor is following God’s order. And the instrument of God’s order is jehad. The Lashkar and its political wing, the Markaz, have for many years been calling for the expansion of jehad to the rest of India to create two independent homelands for the Muslims of South and North India. At the first step, they had called for intensified jehadi activities in Hyderabad and Junagadh. The only voice the Professor listens to is that of God. ’Jehad has actually been commanded by Allah Almighty,’ he says authoritatively, ’and no one can stop it.’ The jehad rests in the Professor’s hands. And don’t forget - he is a very pious man.

The following are the excerpts of an interview conducted with Prof Hafiz Mohammad Saeed in Lahore:

Q- What do you have to say about the Indian allegations of a Pakistani hand in the Mumbai attacks?

A- Like any other patriotic Pakistani, I strongly refute these allegations. There is a general impression that the Indian leadership is using Pakistan as a punching bag to cover its failures at home. Instead of blaming Pakistan, India should have acted as a responsible country, shown patience and focused on investigation of the attacks to find out the real culprits. It is not for the first time that they have blamed Pakistan for their own failures, although none of them have proven true so far. Let me remind you that the Indian leadership was quick to blame Pakistan for masterminding the 2007 Samjhota Express and Malegaon 2008 tragedies. Yet the fact remains that their own security and intelligence agencies have finally arrested an Indian army officer Colonel Purohit as the actual mastermind.

Q- But the Indian authorities insist that the lone Mumbai attacker they have arrested alive has already confessed being a Lashkar-e-Toiba militant coming from Pakistan?

A- Every time there is a major terrorist activity on the Indian soil, the Indian government officials will come out with such cooked up confessional statements. The fact remains that the Indian authorities are not at all interested in holding proper investigations into the Mumbai episode. They are only interested in blaming Pakistan which is evident from the fact that they had started naming Pakistan while the operation was still on.

Q- You mean to say Lashka-e-Toiba is not involved in the Mumbai attacks as being alleged by the Indians?

A- Technically speaking I am not authorized to speak on behalf of Lashkar-e-Toiba. I am the ameer of the Jamaatul Daawa and have nothing to do with the Lashkar. But I can say with authority that the Lashkar does not believe in killing civilians. As far as I know, a Lashkar spokesman in Srinagar has rejected Indian allegations of its involvement in the Mumbai attacks, saying they were actually meant to malign the group and to damage the ongoing freedom struggle in the Kashmir Valley.

Q- But the Indian authorities still think you are the moving spirit behind the Lashkar and probably that’s why they have again demanded your extradition.

A- I had stepped down as the Lashkar ameer way back in December 2001 and it is now being led by Maulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri who is based in Srinagar.

Q- The Indian authorities allege that you are still being backed by the ISI and your group is linked to al-Qaeda?

A- They can say anything. I am not bothered about what they say. I will keep spreading the message of Allah Almighty despite all pressures, knowing fully well that the Indians will continue to mislead the world community by linking us with Lashkar-e-Toiba, with the ISI and even with al Qaeda.

Q- Any comments about the Indian demand for your extradition on terrorism charges?

A- I can’t stop them from making any such demand which is actually a crude attempt to divert the attention of the Indian people from their massive security and intelligence failure that led to the Mumbai attacks. The Jamaatul Daawa is all about relief and social work and everyone in Pakistan knows about our activities. Even otherwise, let me make it clear that I have never been convicted either in Pakistan or in India on any charge. On the other hand, a criminal case is still pending in Hyderabad against the BJP leader L.K. Advani for masterminding the murder of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, although Pakistan has never demanded his extradition.

Q- You must have read about the possibility of an Indian Air Force attack on the Muridke headquarters of the Jamaatul Daawa which they can declare an enemy hide-out. What do you have to say?

A- It will be very unfortunate if India resorts to any such attack because the Muridke Markaz is only used for the purpose of educational activities. I strongly refute the Indian allegations that the Markaz contains any jehad-related training facility. The Indian allegations are only aimed at hoodwinking the international community and it should realize the same.

Q-What will be your response in case the Indians eventually decided to target the Markaz?

A- It is up to the Pakistani government and the Pakistan Army to decide as what to do and how to react to any such misadventure by the Indians. The Army is responsible to safeguard Pakistani geographical frontiers against any external aggression. And like any other patriotic Pakistani, we will also stand behind the armed forces if the Indians resorted to any aggression against the sovereignty of Pakistan.

[email protected]

http://www.metransparent.com/spip.php?p ... 57&lang=en
Need to Know.

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Mensaje por ZULU »

Es la primera vez que lo reconocen
Pakistán: 'La masacre de Bombay se planeó en parte desde nuestro país'

El Gobierno de Pakistán ha reconocido por primera vez que la masacre terrorista de Bombay de finales de noviembre, en la murieron 179 personas, fue planeada "en parte" en territorio paquistaní y anunció que ha abierto un caso en los tribunales del país para juzgar a los culpables.
En rueda de prensa en Islamabad, el titular de Interior, Rehman Malik, explicó además que las autoridades han detenido a seis sospechosos vinculados con el asalto terrorista, algunos de los cuales -según dijo- pertenecen al grupo cachemir Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), al cual la India achacó la operación desde el principio.
"Parte de la conspiración tuvo lugar en Pakistán y parte en la India. Dos individuos que desempeñaron un papel muy importante están bajo nuestra custodia", aseguró Malik, quien instó a Nueva Delhi a ofrecer más cooperación para poder avanzar en la investigación y presentar "pruebas consistentes" ante la Justicia.
"Hemos hecho nuestra parte. El resultado (de la investigación) es una muestra sincera de nuestro compromiso. Pero necesitamos ayuda de la India", abundó.
Malik agregó que las autoridades trasladarán próximamente al Gobierno indio 30 preguntas "fundamentales" para proseguir con sus pesquisas. Explicó además que el atentado contó con apoyo financiero, logístico y de comunicación desde otros países, entre ellos España, Italia o Austria.
Ésta es la primera revelación oficial del informe preliminar que Pakistán ha llevado a cabo en las últimas semanas tras recibir un dossier con pruebas que la India le facilitó.
Nueva Delhi acusó desde un primer momento al LeT de haber perpetrado el ataque que causó al menos 179 muertos en la capital financiera india, y exigió a Pakistán una acción contundente.
Durante la crisis diplomática entre ambas potencias nucleares, aún no cerrada, la India ha llegado incluso a implicar a los servicios secretos paquistaníes (ISI) en la masacre, algo que Islamabad ha negado.
“Non aurum sed ferrum liberanda patria est”

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Mensaje por ZULU »

Tiene su gracia

Un grupo de mujeres indias regala bragas rosas a un grupo integrista para desafiarlos

http://www.libertaddigital.com/sociedad ... 276350802/
“Non aurum sed ferrum liberanda patria est”

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Mensaje por Mueca »

Ojo a esto señores, el sábado pasado la Brigada Antiterrorista de la India evitó otro Mumbai, con la detención de dos sospechosos que planteaban ataques en los mercados, oficinas gubernamentales y las instalaciones nucleares en la ciudad. Procedían de Pakistán. También se detuvieron otros terroristas.

Entre los objetivos estaba:

-un suburbio en Sewri
-mapas de Nhava Sheva
-el Centro de Investigación atómica de Bhabha
-las oficinas de la corporación Oil & Gas Natural en Bandra
-el mercado de Mangaldas
-El Thakkar Mall en Borivli

http://www.hindustantimes.com/Mumbai-te ... 18868.aspx

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Mensaje por kilo009 »

Tres ataques terroristas simultáneos en un mercado, un centro de ópera y un taxi en Bombay. Por el momento 20 muertos y 113 heridos. Uno de los explosivos iba en un paraguas.

http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/07/1 ... 66875.html
Saber para Vencer



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Re: Terrorismo islámico en la India.

Mensaje por LoboAzul »

Al Qaeda anuncia la creación de una célula en India.

12:15 04/09/2014
Moscú, 4 sep (Nóvosti).

El Gobierno hindú declaró alerta en todos los estados del país después de que el líder de Al Qaeda, Ayman al Zawahiri, anunciara la creación de una facción de sus militantes en la India, informó este jueves la televisión local IBN.

"Nueva célula en la India salvará a los musulmanes de la injusticia y la opresión", dijo al Zawahiri.

Según datos de la IBN, las autoridades indias llamaron a militares por todo el país a estar listos para repeler ataques de los combatientes



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