AL QAEDA

[KS]

YO HE SIDO ESPÍA EN AL QAEDA

Número: 1024
Del 10 al 16 de junio del 2007

http://www.xlsemanal.com/web/articulo.p ... icion=2127



Omar Nasiri pasó siete años infiltrado en las redes del terrorismo islamista. En Afganistán conoció a los lugartenientes de Bin Laden, en Bruselas delató a la cúpula europea del GIA y en Londres vigiló a los líderes espirituales de Al Qaeda. Ahora ha decidido contar su historia, la de un espía en el corazón de la `yihad´.



Me llamo Omar Nasiri. Soy marroquí. Nací en 1967. Soy musulmán. Casi nada de lo que acabo de escribir es verdad. Sólo una cosa es estrictamente cierta: soy musulmán. Si revelara mi identidad, la vida de mis seres queridos estaría en peligro. A finales de 1993, en Bruselas, donde vivían mi madre y mis hermanos, di mis primeros pasos en el islamismo radical suministrando armas al GIA argelino, uno de los grupos más sanguinarios del extremismo islámico. Mi hermano mayor, Hakim, había convertido el hogar familiar en el nucleo europeo del grupo, por donde pasaba su flor y nata.


Negocios o yihad. Yo no era como ellos. Me interesaba más el dinero que la yihad, pero comencé a admirarlos porque eran disciplinados –algunos habían estado en los campos de adiestramiento– y por la llama que ardía en ellos, su amor a Dios. También mi Dios. Por allí vi pasar a decenas de musulmanes camino de Chechenia, Argelia o Afganistán. Jóvenes que iban y venían en coches: los dejaban allí y luego los recogían. A veces, se quedaban un par de noches. Yo los envidiaba.


Una tarde subí al desván; había armas por todas partes: rifles, AK-47, Uzis, bolsas de municiones... No sabía qué hacer, tenía que echar a esos tipos de la casa de mi madre.


Dos días después fui al Consulado francés. Me sentía fatal, atormentado por la culpa. Pensaba en Hakim y en los millones de musulmanes humillados por el fracaso del mundo islámico y la arrogancia de Occidente. Pero el estómago me decía que estaba haciendo lo correcto. Sólo quería protegerme a mí y a mi familia. Así me convertí en agente de la DGSE (Dirección General de la Seguridad Exterior) francesa.


Como infiltrado, viví el secuestro, a cargo de un comando del GIA, de un avión de Air France lleno de musulmanes, el 24 de diciembre de 1994, en Argel. Los cabecillas de la célula estaban emocionados. Esperaban una masacre que atrajera la atención del mundo; sentí asco. El plan era hacer estallar el avión sobre París o contra la Torre Eiffel. Pero no sabían pilotar. Años después descubrí que muchos de los reclutas de Al Qaeda se estaban apuntando a academias de vuelo.

En marzo de 1995, la Policía realizó una gran operación contra las redes argelinas, incluyendo una redada en nuestra casa. Semanas después, yo ya estaba convirtiéndome en muyahidín en un campo de adiestramiento en Afganistán.


Un tal Bin Laden. Antes de llegar allí no había oído mencionar a Al Qaeda; tampoco a Bin Laden. Lo primero que supe, a través de un niño llamado Osama, fue que el saudí pagaba la comida del campamento. Con el tiempo descubrí que era rico y que había construido carreteras en el país. En Peshawar, la principal vía de entrada desde Pakistán, conocí a Abu Zubayda, jefe del sistema de reclutamiento para los campos y, en su día, el tercer hombre más buscado del planeta, hoy preso en Guantánamo.


Zubayda me envió al campo de Khalden, un lugar perdido entre montañas. Allí, me convertí en Abu Imam, ya que la primera regla entre los ‘hermanos’ era ocultar nuestra identidad. La primera noche pensé en los disparos que había oído ese día y en los AK-47 que llevaban los `hermanos´; pensé en lo mucho que iba a disfrutar allí. Antes de quedarme dormido, como haría todas las noches que pasé en Khalden, me obligué a recordarme que era un espía.


Mis primeras lecciones como muyahidín las saqué de un manual de adiestramiento en guerrilla urbana con el siguiente encabezado: «Estados Unidos de América». Explicaba cómo colocar minas antitanque, fabricar trampas escondiendo explosivos en cadáveres o llevar a cabo un secuestro.


La rutina no variaba: rezábamos antes del amanecer, hacíamos calistenia en el llano y luego en las montañas. A veces saltábamos, reptábamos, nadábamos en el río helado o llevábamos armas a cuestas. Un día cargamos cohetes enormes, de un metro de longitud, hasta una cumbre. A menudo corríamos descalzos; las rocas eran afiladas, así que acababa con los pies ensangrentados. Aprendí a amoldar el pie a cada roca a fin de deslizarme sin sentir nada.


Suministros infinitos. Tras la instrucción llegaba la teoría con una parada a media tarde para la oración. El primer día, misiles tierra-aire; luego, pistolas, ametralladoras, fusiles o lanzacohetes antitanque capaces de reventar un metro de hormigón o 400 milímetros de blindaje. Los suministros parecían infinitos. Debíamos conocer cada arma que existe en el planeta. También vimos todo tipo de minas, granadas y detonadores y analizamos los diferentes traumas que experimenta la víctima según la distancia a la que es alcanzada. Un día, nos enseñaron todo lo indispensable sobre explosiones nucleares. Aprendíamos de todo: a asaltar una casa y defenderla, camuflaje, vigilancia, a ayudar a los heridos, a asesinar a alguien en la terraza de un café o a clavar un cuchillo en el lugar preciso para perforar los pulmones y provocar la asfixia instantánea de la víctima. También a matar sin armas. La comida era infame; todos los días, el mismo guiso de judías. Le echaban mucha sal; necesitábamos desesperadamente los minerales. Siempre había pollos correteando por la casa de los cocineros afganos; de vez en cuando cocinaban alguno. Lo sabíamos por el olor. Los instructores repetían que en el campo de batalla no habría carne. Tras la cena había instrucción religiosa; la parte más importante, nos decían, del adiestramiento de un muyahidín.


No olvidar que soy un espía. El campamento era el lugar más democrático que he conocido. No había jerarquías, todos opinábamos sobre todo; me sentía parte de una comunidad de devoción total a Dios. Cada noche, me costaba más esfuerzo recordarme que no era uno de ellos. Recordar que era un espía.


En Khalden, me entrené a las órdenes de Ibn al-Sheij. Detenido en Pakistán en 2001 e interrogado en Egipto en 2002, Colin Powell usó sus confesiones para avalar el vínculo entre Sadam Husein y Al Qaeda. Al-Sheij habría afirmado que Irak formó a miembros de la red en la fabricación de armas químicas y biológicas. El problema es que –lo reconocerían más tarde altos oficiales de EE.UU.– Al-Sheij mintió. Según nuestros manuales, la yihad también se podía librar proporcionando información falsa al enemigo.

Una noche, uno de los hermanos preguntó cuál sería la siguiente yihad. Ibn al-Sheij no titubeó: «Irak, un país rico en petróleo con un Gobierno débil. La guerra del Golfo y las sanciones han dejado casi indefenso a Sadam. Si nos hacemos con el poder, Irán quedará rodeado».


Pasé más de medio año en Khalden, hasta que fui destinado a otro campamento: Darunta. Fue allí donde Al Qaeda comenzaría a experimentar con armas químicas bajo la dirección de Abu Jabab al-Masri, a quien también conocí.


Casi un año después de llegar a Afganistán no sabía cómo salir. Un día, Ibn al-Sheij se acercó y me dijo: «Abu Imam, has vivido en Europa muchos años y hablas varias lenguas. Eres listo, valiente e independiente. Por todo ello creemos que la mejor forma de servir a la umma (comunidad) es que vuelvas». De vuelta en Peshawar fui directo al barbero. En los campos no había espejos, casi no me reconocí. Mi barba medía 15 centímetros y mi piel estaba cuarteada y tostada por el sol.


`Londonistán´, el gran error de Occidente. Regresaba a Europa con la misión de formar mi propia célula y enviar dinero a Pakistán. Era la tapadera perfecta para desarrollar la nueva tarea requerida por mis jefes europeos: infiltrarme en `Londonistán´, como se conocía a Londres en los 90, donde los imanes radicales llamaban a los jóvenes musulmanes a la yihad global. Personajes como Abu Qutada, el Emir de Londres, inspirador del 11-M y el 11-S –Mohammed Atta, cabecilla del ataque a EE.UU., era seguidor suyo y, al parecer, los terroristas de Madrid intentaron contactar con él antes de inmolarse en Leganés–, que reclutaba abiertamente en un centro comunitario, fueron largamente consentidos. Los británicos sólo querían saber si incitaban a sus fieles a atacar Inglaterra. Lo que hicieran fuera de sus fronteras les era indiferente.

Igual ocurrió con Abu Hamza, El Gancho, a cuyos sermones asistieron algunos de los implicados en el 7-J. El incendiario imán de la mezquita de Finsbury Park, reconocible por el garfio que culmina su brazo derecho, cimentó su influencia presumiendo de haber perdido las manos y un ojo luchando en Afganistán. El episodio fue bastante menos heroico; simplemente pagó las consecuencias de una torpeza en el manejo de nitroglicerina. Cuando Hamza supo que yo había estado en un campamento, me llamó a su despacho. «Estuve con alguien que usted conoce», le dije en tono conspirativo. «Uno de mis instructores fue Assad Allah. Él me contó lo de la nitro y lo que le pasó.» Apartó la mirada y susurró: «Hermano, por favor, no le cuente eso a nadie».


Durante casi un año envié dinero, proporcionado por el MI5, a Pakistán e informé a los británicos de las interioridades de `Londonistán´. Un día aparecieron tres jóvenes musulmanes, nombraron a uno de los detenidos al que yo había delatado en Bruselas y decidí que esa etapa de mi vida había finalizado.


Mi revancha, mi `yihad´. Mi historia finaliza en Alemania, donde vivía Fátima, mi actual esposa, a quien conocí durante una breve estancia en París. El 11 de septiembre de 2001 llamé a mi contacto en el servicio de inteligencia alemán para ofrecer mi ayuda. Le dije: «Sé quién está detrás. Sé cómo son y cómo piensan. Quiero ayudar». Hubo un silencio al otro lado de la línea y luego: «Te llamaremos si te necesitamos». Nunca más supe de él. Fue el final de mi carrera como agente secreto. Cuatro años después, los atentados del 7-J en Londres me impulsaron a contar mi historia. La de un hombre que, durante siete años, asistió al surgimiento de lo que hoy se considera la mayor amenaza de Occidente.


Cuando empecé a escribir, lo que más me motivaba era la rabia. Abandonado por mis jefes, había estado viviendo en Alemania sin papeles durante cinco años, haciendo los trabajos más degradantes. Todavía dependo de los ingresos de Fátima. Ya no soy espía, pero sigue habiendo un muyahidín en mí. No he contado mi historia porque quiera salvar a Occidente de los terroristas. Me interesa más advertir al islam contra sus terribles excesos. Ahora, ésta es mi yihad.

[Esteban]

THEGUARDIAN publica que la CIA está reclutando sudaneses para infiltrarlos en redes yihadistas.

CIA recruits Sudanese to infiltrate Arab jihadi groups

Ewen MacAskill
Tuesday June 12, 2007
The Guardian


The CIA, faced with the impossibility of infiltrating white Americans into radical groups in the Middle East, is recruiting Arab-speaking Sudanese citizens, in spite of sanctions against the country over the killings in Darfur, it emerged yesterday. Sudanese recruits have been providing information about individuals passing through Sudan to Somalia and elsewhere in the the Horn of Africa and Iraq. The Sudanese government is reported to have detained suspects in Khartoum at the request of the US.

The US state department issued a report describing Sudan as a "strong partner in the war on terror". A state department official said the Sudanese had done things that had saved lives but acknowledged there was a contradiction: "The bottom line is that they are bombing their people ... Dealing with Sudan, it seems like they are always playing both ends against the middle."

A former high-ranking official, quoted in the Los Angeles Times, acknowledged the importance of the intelligence: "If you've got jihadists travelling via Sudan to get into Iraq, there's a pattern there in and of itself that would not raise suspicion. It creates an opportunity to send Sudanese into that pipeline." A US official still in post told the paper: "Intelligence cooperation takes place for a whole lot of reasons. It's not always between people who love each other deeply."

US intelligence agencies do deals with all sorts of governments in the Middle East and central Asia, not only for intelligence-gathering but for secret detention centres and as fuelling stops in rendition cases. Iran provided information to the US to help its overthrow of the Taliban in 2001.

Another ex-CIA official said: "There's not much that blond-haired, blue-eyed case officers from the United States can do in the entire Middle East, and there's nothing they can do in Iraq. Sudanese can go places we don't go. They're Arabs. They can wander around."

But relations have been soured by Darfur, a high-profile issue in the US, with campaigners calling for sanctions against Khartoum. Although Mr Bush has taken a lead on sanctions, critics claim he has not gone as far as he could have and blame this on intelligence cooperation.

Gordon Johndroe, a spokesman for the national security council, said he did not believe sanctions would ruin intelligence cooperation. "We certainly expect the Sudanese to continue efforts against terrorism, because it's in their own interests, not just ours," he said.

[KS]

La inteligencia egipcia advierte de que Al-Qaida dirige la lucha en Gaza

DV./JERUSALÉN

El jefe de la inteligencia egipcia, general Omar Suleiman, es, con mucha diferencia, el representante árabe que mejor conoce los recovecos de las facciones palestinas con las que ha tratado durante años como mediador infatigable. De ahí que no resulte nada despreciable su último veredicto, surgido a la vista de la desquiciada debacle en que se ha sumido la Franja, en el que sostiene que terroristas de Al-Qaida están dirigiendo las sangrientas batallas de estos días en Gaza. Hasta el punto de que el alto funcionario ha llegado hablar de «un tercer partido» infiltrado entre la población, que habría provocado la debacle siguiendo su agenda yihadista internacional con la intención de hacer reventar el pequeño territorio hasta convertirlo en un 'Gazastán'. Y, a partir de ahí, continuar con las aspiraciones ya anunciadas por las huestes de Bin Laden de «extender su actividad más allá de la Franja», léase Israel.

El aviso del general Suleiman acerca de la infección yihadista se producía en el marco de una reunión mantenida el pasado miércoles en El Cairo con su homólogo jordano, el general Mohammed Dhabi, coincidiendo con la cumbre que en la misma fecha mantenían en la capital los máximos mandatarios de ambos países, el presidente, Hosni Mubarak, y el rey Abdalá de Jordania, respectivamente.

En este encuentro, oficiales que acompañaban al jefe de los Servicios Secretos egipcios presentaron «material» recientemente descubierto en la Franja que -según señalaba ayer el rotativo Yedioth Ahronot de Tel Aviv- demostraría que la táctica salvaje y los «ataques irregulares» que se están empleando obedecen a las órdenes de Al-Qaida. «Está claro que los terroristas tiran a matar y no a herir, como era la norma no hace mucho tiempo, la forma de la actual guerra en Gaza está conducida con las mismas características con que Al-Qaida opera en Irak», advirtieron.

Para el equipo de El Cairo, uno de los objetivos sería abortar el Gobierno de unidad constituido el 18 de marzo según el acuerdo salido de La Meca el 8 de febrero anterior. También a su programa responderían los sucesivos ataques a la vivienda del primer ministro de Hamás, Ismail Hanniya, responderían a los intereses yihadistas. «Al-Qaida cree que Hanniya no hace lo que tiene que hacer: no lanza suficientes cohetes Qassam contra Israel, y toma posiciones mucha más moderadas que las del líder espiritual, Khaled Meshal».

http://www.diariovasco.com/prensa/20070 ... 70614.html

[Esteban]

tras las últimas detencionesd de operativos de al Qaeda, fuentes de inteligencia USA consideran que Ben Laden sigue vivo y oculto en las zonas tribales del oeste de Paquistán.

Bin Laden lies low, protected in Pakistan

(AP)


This undated photo shows Osama bin Laden who is said to be in Afghanistan at the time the picture was taken in early 2005. The United States has firm evidence bin Laden is alive based on interrogations of captured al Qaeda members and intercepted communications in which known terrorists talk about him, a military intelligence source told The Examiner. Rowan Scarborough, The Examiner

2007-06-18 17:37:00.0

WASHINGTON -
Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden has surrounded himself in a protective network of Islamic supporters in the vast tribal areas of western Pakistan, complicating the hunt for America's most wanted criminal, U.S. intelligence officials say.

The United States has firm evidence bin Laden is alive based on interrogations of captured al Qaeda members and intercepted communications in which known terrorists talk about him, a military intelligence source told The Examiner.

"We get a lot of chatter one or two levels of management below bin Laden that refers to him as 'the Sheik,' 'the esteemed leader,'" said the source, who asked not to be named because he is discussing sensitive intelligence. "We believe him to be alive based on some of the people we have captured who have said that." The source said the United States has picked up no credible information that bin Laden is dead.

The CIA late last year captured Abd Hadi al-Iraqi, believed to be one of the closest al Qaeda operatives to bin Laden. The United States interrogated al-Iraqi for several months before sending him to the military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Over five years ago, bin Laden crossed the border from Afghanistan's Tora Bora mountain region to find refuge among like-minded tribal leaders in Pakistan. Bin Laden's voice has not been picked up in any communication intercept since he was heard by the United States on a short-range radio in Tora Bora.

"He is someone who is very concerned about his personal safety and security and takes measures to insure his profile is low," said a U.S. intelligence official. "This is not to mention his physical location, which makes attempts to locate an individual difficult. The fact is he has a support network, people who sympathize with him."

The CIA in 2005 closed Alec Station, the office in Northern Virginia dedicated to tracking bin Laden. It was part of a reorganization of the CIA's Counter Terrorism Center, which has field offices, including one in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

"The work of Alec Station never stopped or diminished, rather it transitioned to other organizational elements within CTC," a former CIA officer told The Examiner.

P.J. Crowley, a military analyst at the Center for American Progress and a former national security aide to President Clinton, said the Iraq war has diverted assets that could be used to find bin Laden.

"Now that he is in the tribal areas, I doubt that a bounty of any number will be helpful," Crowley said "Given tribal relationships, they will protect him."

De esta manera, según diversas informaciones, t endríamos al mulah Omar en Qetta y a Osama en la FATA.

[Esteban]

el NYTIMES revela que en 2005 el Departamento de Defensa anuló en el último segundo, con los operativos ya en los aviones, un raid de FOEs en Paquistán cuyo objetivo era atrapar al Dr al Zawahiri.

Una vez se demuestra ese problema que encontramos una y otra vez; falta lo que se podría llamar "fase de explotación" del ciclo de inteligencia. No vale quedarse en la "difusión", como nos enseñan los textos y los gurús del tema. Ese concepto está abocado al fracaso frente a una amenaza multilateral y que trabaja en red, como es al Qaeda.

En el artículo se comenta cómo los agentes de inteligencia se lamentan de la falta de coraje del decisor político, y cómo los operativos de OEs se quejan de falta de inteligencia optimizada y en tiempo real. Verde y con asas.

July 8, 2007
U.S. Aborted Raid on Qaeda Chiefs in Pakistan in ’05
By MARK MAZZETTI
WASHINGTON, July 7 — A secret military operation in early 2005 to capture senior members of Al Qaeda in Pakistan’s tribal areas was aborted at the last minute after top Bush administration officials decided it was too risky and could jeopardize relations with Pakistan, according to intelligence and military officials.

The target was a meeting of Qaeda leaders that intelligence officials thought included Ayman al-Zawahri, Osama bin Laden’s top deputy and the man believed to run the terrorist group’s operations.

But the mission was called off after Donald H. Rumsfeld, then the defense secretary, rejected an 11th-hour appeal by Porter J. Goss, then the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, officials said. Members of a Navy Seals unit in parachute gear had already boarded C-130 cargo planes in Afghanistan when the mission was canceled, said a former senior intelligence official involved in the planning.

Mr. Rumsfeld decided that the operation, which had ballooned from a small number of military personnel and C.I.A. operatives to several hundred, was cumbersome and put too many American lives at risk, the current and former officials said. He was also concerned that it could cause a rift with Pakistan, an often reluctant ally that has barred the American military from operating in its tribal areas, the officials said.

The decision to halt the planned “snatch and grab” operation frustrated some top intelligence officials and members of the military’s secret Special Operations units, who say the United States missed a significant opportunity to try to capture senior members of Al Qaeda.

Their frustration has only grown over the past two years, they said, as Al Qaeda has improved its abilities to plan global attacks and build new training compounds in Pakistan’s tribal areas, which have become virtual havens for the terrorist network.

In recent months, the White House has become increasingly irritated with Pakistan’s president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, for his inaction on the growing threat of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

About a dozen current and former military and intelligence officials were interviewed for this article, all of whom requested anonymity because the planned 2005 mission remained classified.

Spokesmen for the Pentagon, the C.I.A. and the White House declined to comment. It is unclear whether President Bush was informed about the planned operation.

The officials acknowledge that they are not certain that Mr. Zawahri attended the 2005 meeting in North Waziristan, a mountainous province just miles from the Afghan border. But they said that the United States had communications intercepts that tipped them off to the meeting, and that intelligence officials had unusually high confidence that Mr. Zawahri was there.

Months later, in early May 2005, the C.I.A. launched a missile from a remotely piloted Predator drone, killing Haitham al-Yemeni, a senior Qaeda figure whom the C.I.A. had tracked since the meeting.

It has long been known that C.I.A. operatives conduct counterterrorism missions in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Details of the aborted 2005 operation provide a glimpse into the Bush administration’s internal negotiations over whether to take unilateral military action in Pakistan, where General Musharraf’s fragile government is under pressure from dissidents who object to any cooperation with the United States.

Pentagon officials familiar with covert operations said that planners had to consider the political and human risks of undertaking a military campaign in a sovereign country, even in an area like Pakistan’s tribal lands, where the government has only tenuous control. Even with its shortcomings, Pakistan has been a vital American ally since the Sept. 11 attacks, and the militaries of the two countries have close ties.

The Pentagon officials said tension was inherent in any decision to approve such a mission: a smaller military footprint allows a better chance of a mission going undetected, but it also exposes the units to greater risk of being killed or captured.

Officials said one reason Mr. Rumsfeld called off the 2005 operation was that the number of troops involved in the mission had grown to several hundred, including Army Rangers, members of the Navy Seals and C.I.A. operatives, and he determined that the United States could no longer carry out the mission without General Musharraf’s permission. It is unlikely that the Pakistani president would have approved an operation of that size, officials said.

Some outside experts said American counterterrorism operations had been hamstrung because of concerns about General Musharraf’s shaky government.

“The reluctance to take risk or jeopardize our political relationship with Musharraf may well account for the fact that five and half years after 9/11 we are still trying to run bin Laden and Zawahri to ground,” said Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University.

Those political considerations have created resentment among some members of the military’s Special Operations forces.

“The Special Operations guys are tearing their hair out at the highest levels,” said a former Bush administration official with close ties to those troops. While they have not received good intelligence on the whereabouts of top Qaeda members recently, he said, they say they believe they have sometimes had useful information on lower-level figures.

“There is a degree of frustration that is off the charts, because they are looking at targets on a daily basis and can’t move against them,” he said.

In early 2005, after learning about the Qaeda meeting, the military developed a plan for a small Navy Seals unit to parachute into Pakistan to carry out a quick operation, former officials said.

But as the operation moved up the military chain of command, officials said, various planners bulked up the force’s size to provide security for the Special Operations forces.

“The whole thing turned into the invasion of Pakistan,” said the former senior intelligence official involved in the planning. Still, he said he thought the mission was worth the risk. “We were frustrated because we wanted to take a shot,” he said.

Several former officials interviewed said the operation was not the only occasion since the Sept. 11 attacks that plans were developed to use a large American military force in Pakistan. It is unclear whether any of those missions have been executed.

Some of the military and intelligence officials familiar with the 2005 events say it showed a rift between operators in the field and a military bureaucracy that has still not effectively adapted to hunt for global terrorists, moving too cautiously to use Special Operations troops against terrorist targets.

That criticism has echoes of the risk aversion that the officials said pervaded efforts against Al Qaeda during the Clinton administration, when missions to use American troops to capture or kill Mr. bin Laden in Afghanistan were never executed because they were considered too perilous, risked killing civilians or were based on inadequate intelligence. Rather than sending in ground troops, the Clinton White House instead chose to fire cruise missiles in what became failed attempts to kill Mr. bin Laden and his deputies — a tactic Mr. Bush criticized shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks.

Since then, the C.I.A. has launched missiles from Predator aircraft in the tribal areas several times, with varying degrees of success. Intelligence officials say they believe that in January 2006, an airstrike narrowly missed killing Mr. Zawahri, who hours earlier had attended a dinner in Damadola, a Pakistani village.

General Musharraf cast his lot with the Bush administration in the hunt for Al Qaeda after the 2001 attacks, and he has periodically ordered Pakistan’s military to conduct counterterrorism missions in the tribal areas, provoking fierce resistance there. But in recent months he has pulled back, prompting Mr. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney to issue stern warnings in private that he risked losing American aid if he did not step up efforts against Al Qaeda, senior administration officials have said.

Officials said that mid-2005 was a period when they were gathering good intelligence about Al Qaeda’s leaders in Pakistan’s tribal areas. By the next year, however, the White House had become frustrated by the lack of progress in the hunt for Mr. bin Laden and Mr. Zawahri.

In early 2006, President Bush ordered a “surge” of dozens of C.I.A. agents to Pakistan, hoping that an influx of intelligence operatives would lead to better information, officials said. But that has brought the United States no closer to locating Al Qaeda’s top two leaders. The latest message from them came this week, in a new tape in which Mr. Zawahri urged Iraqis and Muslims around the world to show more support for Islamist insurgents in Iraq.

In his recently published memoir, George J. Tenet, the former C.I.A. director, said the intelligence about Mr. bin Laden’s whereabouts during the Clinton years was similarly sparse. The information was usually only at the “50-60% confidence level,” he wrote, not sufficient to justify American military action.

“As much as we all wanted Bin Ladin dead, the use of force by a superpower requires information, discipline, and time,” Mr. Tenet wrote. “We rarely had the information in sufficient quantities or the time to evaluate and act on it.”

[Loopster]

¿Será este el famoso incidente que propició la creación del Strategic Support Branch? porque pasar de un planteamiento de unos cuantos agentes del SAD y apoyo de OEs, a una incursión paracaidista de varios centenares de SEALs es una escalada de narices.

[Esteban]

Reaparece ben Laden en un vídeo al que ha tenido acceso la CNN. La verdad es que hace unos días se veía venir en los forum yihadistas aunque en algunos casos ha llevado a la confusión con un vídeo anterior donde se le ve en las montañas con una guerrera mimetizada. Dicen que en un paisaje típico del extremo nororiental de Paquistán, cerca de China.

(CNN) -- Osama bin Laden stresses the importance of martyrdom for Muslim causes in a videotape that purportedly contains a 50-second message from the al Qaeda leader.

The 40-minute videotape, whose audio was being translated from Arabic by CNN, was intercepted before it was to appear on several Islamist Web sites known for carrying statements from al Qaeda and other radical groups.

The videotape was made in the last four weeks, but the clips appear to be old, said Octavia Nasr, CNN's senior editor for Arab affairs. There is no indication of where it was shot, and CNN cannot verify its authenticity.

Bin Laden, with a body guard standing directly behind him, is looking down slightly in the video, appearing to address an audience below, which is unseen.

He says that the Prophet Mohammed wanted to be a martyr, and that is a worthy goal for every Muslim.

"So be alert, be wise and think. What is this status that the best of mankind wished for himself? He wished to be a martyr. He himself said, 'By him in whose hands my life is! I would love to attack and be martyred, then attack again and be martyred, then attack again and be martyred.'

"So this whole broad life is summarized by him who was inspired by God, the Lord of the heavens and earth, praised and exalted is he. This glorious prophet who was inspired by God summarized this entire life by these words. He wished upon himself this status. Happy is the one who was chosen by God as a martyr."

Bin Laden was one of several men appearing and speaking on the tape. They include Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq who was killed in a U.S. airstrike June 7, 2006.

The video was branded by As-Sahab Media, the company that traditionally handles al Qaeda communications to the public.

The environment shown is similar to that on releases made before the September 11, 2001, terror attacks, in which bin Laden is seen in the company of some of the hijackers, Nasr said.

Some of the backdrops also resemble those shown in videos when the U.S. attacks against the Taliban in Afghanistan began not long after the 9/11 attacks, she added.

The last time a recording of bin Laden was made public it was an audiotape, with an Arabic transcript, released on June 30, 2006.

For several weeks, radical Islamist Web sites have been announcing that there would be "good news soon from Sheikh Osama bin Laden

hace unos días en el foro alhanein.com dos "hermanos" discutían sobre el nuevo vídeo de ben Laden, y al dar la descripción del paisaje y tal, otros foristas se creían que en realidad había una confusión con vídeos anteriores.

[Esteban]

La especialista Laura Mansfield ya ha colgado en su web comentarios del vídeo y un enlace al mismo

Bin Laden stresses martyrdom in short segment of new As Sahab video

He himself said ‘By Him in Whose Hands my life is!
I would love to attack and be martyred, then attack again and be martyred, then attack again and be martyred.’

Those are the words of Osama Bin Laden in a short clip from a longer As Sahab video obtained this morning by LauraMansfield.com.

The Bin Laden clip appears to be a short portion of an older video of the Al Qaeda leader speaking to his followers about martyrdom. There are no indications as to the date when the clip was filmed.

Bin Laden is shown dressed in dark, with a camouflage jacket, and a dark cap. He has a ring and a watch on his right hand, and gestures freely with both hands.

In the clip, 50 seconds long, Bin Laden says:

The seal of the prophets and all messengers (reference to Prophet Mohammed), prayers and peace be upon him, wished this status.

So be alert, be wise and think.

What is this status that the best of mankind wished for himself?

He wished to be a martyr.

He himself said ‘By Him in Whose Hands my life is! I would love to attack and be martyred, then attack again and be martyred, then attack again and be martyred.’

So this whole broad life is summarized by he who was inspired by God, the lord of the heavens and earth, praised and exalted is He.

This glorious prophet who was inspired by God summarized this entire life by these words. He wished upon himself this status. Happy is the one who was chosen by god as a martyr.

The remainder of the video includes various clips showing jihadist fighters reading their final wills, as well as statements from new Al Qaeda in Afghanistan commander Abu Yazid.

The video surfaced on jihadist forums where similar Al Qaeda statements have been released previously. It is branded with the As Sahab logo. No subtitles were provided.

The video clip can be downloaded here. A copy of the full video has been sent to subscribers.

http://www.lauramansfield.com/obl_july.wmv

Dos cosas indicativas; se ve detrás a un guardaespaldas, lo que en el caso de ben Laden se sabe, por el yemení que ejerció hace unos años ese mismo cargo, que tiene instrucciones de acabar con él si se ve acorralado, y esa llamada al "martirio" diciendo que Mahoma quería ser mártir. Igual no lo ve muy claro. Otra cosa, dicen por ahí que el parlanchín al Zawahiri manda los mensajes de audio por Voip o un protocolo similar. Luego dicen que quieren volver al siglo VIII...

[Esteban]

Más reacciones. De Counterterrorismblog, destacar lo siguiente

Osama Bin Laden quotes Muhammad based on Hadeeth Sunnah Sahih Bukhari, Book 52. Fighting for the Cause of Allah (Jihaad), specifically in Volume 4, Book 52, Number 54. Sahih Bukhari is a collection of sayings and deeds of Muhammad, also known as the sunnah. The specific reference states: "By Him in Whose Hands my life is! Were it not for some men amongst the believers who dislike to be left behind me and whom I cannot provide with means of conveyance, I would certainly never remain behind any Sariya' (army-unit) setting out in Allah's Cause. By Him in Whose Hands my life is! I would love to be martyred in Allah's Cause and then get resurrected and then get martyred, and then get resurrected again and then get martyred and then get resurrected again and then get martyred."

The video also included "various clips showing jihadist fighters reading their final wills, as well as statements from new Al Qaeda in Afghanistan commander Abu Yazid."

ABC states the martrydom video included statements from "al Qaeda followers from Pakistan, Morocco, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Turkistan."

la cadena ABC

Possible New Message From Osama Bin Laden
Share July 14, 2007 3:37 PM

Rhonda Schwartz and Hoda Osman Report:

A brief clip of an older-looking Osama bin Laden is contained in a new al Qaeda videotape praising al Qaeda martyrs posted on jihadi Web sites early this morning.

Experts who study al Qaeda videos told ABC News they had not previously seen the clip of bin Laden, which was released with little fanfare and contains no date references, but say it is most likely an unreleased portion of an earlier message.

The al Qaeda leader speaks of martyrdom for roughly one minute as he addresses an unseen group in a mountainous location, wearing fatigues, a watch and ring, and with extensive gray in his beard.

Video Watch the New, Previously Unseen Video of Al Qaeda's Head.
The clip is part of a 40-minute film "Scent of Heaven" from al Qaeda's as Sahab video propaganda arm discovered on the Internet by Laura Mansfield of Strategic Translations.

The clip also contains several "martyrdom" videos from various al Qaeda followers from Pakistan, Morocco, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Turkistan.

[KS]

Según La Sexta Noticias OEs francesas tuvieron a tiro a Bin Laden

Hoy a las 20:30 en el noticiario de La Sexta han dado la noticia de que un grupo de Operaciones Especiales francés tuvo a tiro a Bin Laden pero que no recibieron la orden de disparar. Me ha parecido entender que era un anticipo de un reportaje, o tal vez un libro.

En la noticia han metido un pedazo de ese reportaje, en el que una voz en off hablando en francés, con subtítulos en español, decía que en 2003 y 2004 tuvieron a tiro a Bin Laden y que los americanos no les dieron la orden de disparar. La voz explicaba que se encontraban en un combate, atrincherados, que uno de los tiradores dijo que tenían a Bin Laden en la mira, llamaron a Bagram, desde donde los americanos coordinaban la misión, y no obtuvieron respuesta.



Acto seguido los de La Sexta han insinuado burdamente que a los americanos tal vez no les interese capturar a Bin Laden.

Para reforzar esta tesis han metido las declaraciones de un señor de la guerra antitalibán (presentado así por los de La Sexta), que vive en la región de Tora Bora, se mostraba indignado porque los americanos no le pidieron ayuda al intentar capturar a Bin Laden.


Un saludo,
KS