LAS PECULIARIDADES DEL ISLAM EN PRISIÓN
Moderadores: Mod. 1, Mod. 5, Mod. 4, Mod. 3, Mod. 2
Re: LAS PECULIARIDADES DEL ISLAM EN PRISIÓN
Aquí teneis un enlace a la página de un antropólogo que ha estudiado el Islam en las prisiones británicas. Alude al concepto de lo que el llama "prison islam". Se llama Gabriel Marranci. En una introducción a su libro hace referencia al estudio de la identidad musulmana dentro de las prisiones. Explica que divide el libro en varios capítulos en los que se relata como asumen el impacto del ingreso en prisión, como influye esto en su percepción del Islam en prisión y la influencia de esto en el desarrollo del "prison Islam". Y también estudia el proceso por el que los internos musulmanes se adhieren a una interpretación heterodoxa del Islam. Cuando habla de los primeros pasos en prisión de los musulmanes, explica la importancia añadida que el Islam y sus ritos tienen para soportar el ambiente hostil de la prisión y también para hacer frente a los efectos psicológicos de ese ambiente (a esos efectos adversos que produce el ingreso en prisión se ha referido en numerosas ocasiones el profesor de la Universidad de Granada, Humberto Trujillo) hostil. También menciona la importancia del Islam para unir a individuos frente a amenazas reales vividas dentro de la prisión. La importancia del Islam y su externalización, según el autor conlleva problemas de convivencia con otros internos y agudiza problemas como la discriminación dentro del mismo colectivo musulmán hacia los chiitas frente a la mayoría sunnita. Por otra parte el antropólogo dice que la simplificación de valores a la que fuerza el estar interno en prisión para controlar la situación conduce a dualismos violentos derivados de la propia dinámica de la prisión. Se produce así una radicalización violenta que no precisa a veces ser alimentada por influencias externas.
El enlace es http://marranci.wordpress.com/2010/01/0 ... d-prisons/
El enlace es http://marranci.wordpress.com/2010/01/0 ... d-prisons/
Re: LAS PECULIARIDADES DEL ISLAM EN PRISIÓN
En el mismo enlace, el autor cuando comenta el Capítulo 6 habla del proceso de radicalización y habla de algo que mi propia experiencia puede avalar, los internos se consideran condenados injustamente y para justificarse desarrollan un sentido de dignidad que a veces degenera en un rechazo a la autoridad. En este caso ,en prisión es frecuente que los internos consideren la desobediencia a las normas como una lucha contra algo injusto (no pocos internos usan la expresión guerreros, lo que es fruto de una percepción infantil de la situación y de esto los funcionarios de prisiones saben de que hablo)
El autor habla de como se usa el concepto de la unicidad de Dios (el Tawhid) y esto, sí que me ha parecido muy interesante. Abrazando este principio, la única autoridad a la que el interno musulmán se somete es la de Dios. Se rechaza la autoridad de la prisión y la de sus colaboradores como los Imanes Oficiales por ser inmoral. El Tawhid se convierte así en un instrumento de cohesión y de supervivencia y al mismo tiempo de mantenimiento de la propia identidad personal. La ideología del Tawhid surge según este antropólogo por el contacto con el ambiente de la prisión de forma espontánea y no tanto por un adoctrinamiento religioso. Añade el autor que la propia esencia del Islam (como de otras religiones monoteistas) basada en rituales repetitivos y enseñanzas dogmáticas es propicia a fomentar conductas radicales y violentas. El propio ambiente penitenciario añade el autor fomenta una visión del Islam menos flexible de la que se practica fuera de la prisión.
No quiero dejar de señalar la importancia a la referencia que el autor hace a la teoría del tawhid como medio de identidad y de supervivencia. Mi propia experiencia personal me permite decir que entre los grupos de no musulmanes es frecuente desarrollar algún tipo de visión ideológica que justifican comportamientos contrarios a las normas. De primera mano puede decirse, que en Departamentos de Régimen Cerrado internos conflictivos tratan de ajustar su imagen y explicar su situación abrazando ideologías o símbolos que en muchas ocasiones no creo que ni siquiera alcancen a comprender. Así ,es frecuente ver circular ejemplares del libro de Sun Tzu, "El Arte de la Guerra", o que en sus celdas tengan imaginería referida al Che Guevara o propaganda anarquista y antisistema, independientemente de que la comprendan. Se trata de justificar "la lucha". Ellos mismos se ven como guerreros contra todo y buscan referencias.
En el caso de los musulmanes se trataría de lo expuesto por Marranci. En el caso de otros colectivos se trata de otras referencias pero el concepto del Tawhid surgido de ambiente penitenciario guarda paralelismo con los fenómenos a los que he hecho mención y que son reales. No todos los internos entran en esta dinámica, pero es cierto que los que entran en la dinámica más conflictiva usan esos conceptos como una justificación y un referente.
El autor habla de como se usa el concepto de la unicidad de Dios (el Tawhid) y esto, sí que me ha parecido muy interesante. Abrazando este principio, la única autoridad a la que el interno musulmán se somete es la de Dios. Se rechaza la autoridad de la prisión y la de sus colaboradores como los Imanes Oficiales por ser inmoral. El Tawhid se convierte así en un instrumento de cohesión y de supervivencia y al mismo tiempo de mantenimiento de la propia identidad personal. La ideología del Tawhid surge según este antropólogo por el contacto con el ambiente de la prisión de forma espontánea y no tanto por un adoctrinamiento religioso. Añade el autor que la propia esencia del Islam (como de otras religiones monoteistas) basada en rituales repetitivos y enseñanzas dogmáticas es propicia a fomentar conductas radicales y violentas. El propio ambiente penitenciario añade el autor fomenta una visión del Islam menos flexible de la que se practica fuera de la prisión.
No quiero dejar de señalar la importancia a la referencia que el autor hace a la teoría del tawhid como medio de identidad y de supervivencia. Mi propia experiencia personal me permite decir que entre los grupos de no musulmanes es frecuente desarrollar algún tipo de visión ideológica que justifican comportamientos contrarios a las normas. De primera mano puede decirse, que en Departamentos de Régimen Cerrado internos conflictivos tratan de ajustar su imagen y explicar su situación abrazando ideologías o símbolos que en muchas ocasiones no creo que ni siquiera alcancen a comprender. Así ,es frecuente ver circular ejemplares del libro de Sun Tzu, "El Arte de la Guerra", o que en sus celdas tengan imaginería referida al Che Guevara o propaganda anarquista y antisistema, independientemente de que la comprendan. Se trata de justificar "la lucha". Ellos mismos se ven como guerreros contra todo y buscan referencias.
En el caso de los musulmanes se trataría de lo expuesto por Marranci. En el caso de otros colectivos se trata de otras referencias pero el concepto del Tawhid surgido de ambiente penitenciario guarda paralelismo con los fenómenos a los que he hecho mención y que son reales. No todos los internos entran en esta dinámica, pero es cierto que los que entran en la dinámica más conflictiva usan esos conceptos como una justificación y un referente.
Re: LAS PECULIARIDADES DEL ISLAM EN PRISIÓN
Os dejo entero el contenido del enlace referido a Gabriel Marranci.
I am pleased to inform you that my book ‘Faith, Ideology, and Fear: Muslim Identities Within and Beyond Prisons‘, published by Continuum, is now available. This book is based on my 4-year-research both within UK prisons as well as outside them. I have written about the research itself before. You can find the book both in bookstores as well as Internet sellers such as
as many academic books today, the publisher has decided to issue first the hardback and consider a paperback only in the case that, after one year, the book has sold enough. So, if you are interested in reading it, and you cannot afford the price, ask the librarian at your university or public library to acquire it (there is also an electronic copy which is cheeper). Below I shall offer a summary of the chapters. If you wish, you can read the full Introduction on my personal website.
In this book I have aimed to offer an understanding of the reasons for which today more Muslims are detained in prison (Chapter 3); how Muslim prisoners experience prison (Chapter 4); how such experience influences their ‘making sense’ of Islam in prison, and the consequent development of a prison Islam (Chapter 5); the process through which some Muslim prisoners may adhere to unorthodox and emotional interpretations of Islam that are based on spontaneous exegetical reflections (Chapter 6); and finally the difficulties, isolation and the lack of support that former Muslim prisoners experience and the risks that they, and consequently our societies, may face as far as reoffending and terrorism are concerned (Chapter 7).
In Chapter 2 I have discussed the risk involved in solely focusing on religion, seen as a powerful cultural system of symbols. In this book, I have adopted a different view, and as an anthropologist advocating in my work that anthropology must rediscover the ‘anthropos’, and suggested that we should start not from Islam (or even ethnicity or culture), but rather from those individuals whom I have met, interacted with, observed and tried to understand. They are not symbols or made by symbols. They have bones, flesh, veins and brains. They are alive and interact with not only others but also the surrounding environment, and are thus affected by it. They can laugh, cry, blush, or display many other emotions, consciously or unconsciously, remember events and express their identities.
For this reason, in this book we will start our journey outside prison (Chapter 3) by discussing the difficult socio-economic, yet also emotional, environment in which many Muslims in the United Kingdom, live today. Geographically, Muslim communities tend to live in the most deprived areas of the most densely populated cities in the United Kingdom. Although reading prison statistics may give the impression that there exists an increase of ‘Muslim crimes’, in reality an attentive comparative statistical approach reveals that the higher proportion of Muslims incarcerated are the result of independent, rather than dependent, variables.
As I have explained in Chapter 3, Muslims in the United Kingdom have a young population, and criminological research has demonstrated that the young age of a population has a great impact upon offenses and incarceration rates . Leaving aside national statistics concerning Muslims in prison and examining some British locations in which the Muslim and non-Muslim population are nearly equal, we may observe that the imprisonment rate (see Chapter 3) is virtually the same for both the groups. Therefore, we can only reject suggestions, such as that which Macey (2002) proposed, that ‘believing in Islam’ exposes Muslims to social and economic disadvantage as well as increases the risk of their committing crimes.
In reality, as I have explained in Chapter 3, British Muslims born of Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Indian or Arab origins are, despite numerous political and journalistic claims, ‘integrating’ within British society. Integration is local, and in many cases this means that these young people integrate into troubled areas which are affected by drugs, gang culture, prostitution and so forth. Difficult urban spaces have an impact upon the levels of criminal behaviour among the general population. Muslims tend, however, to be more vulnerable because of the rejection that they often receive from mainstream society because of their ethnic, or religious, identities.
In Chapter 4, we start to observe the lives of Muslim prisoners from their first steps inside. As in the rest of this book, we observe them as human beings, whom in this case ‘feel to be Muslims’ (Marranci 2008). The prison environment affects them in the same way that it would any other person, as many elements of psychology, emotions and neurocognitive factors are universal. For this reason, in Chapter 4, I have first discussed the process of adaptation to prison and the difficulties involved.
I have explained how Islamic rituals and practices acquire an extra layer of meaning that helps Muslim prisoners to survive within the prison environment as well as manage psychological changes. Many variables affect the relationship between prisoners, and ethnicity is surely one of the most powerful. Yet we have noticed that Islam has been used by prisoners to cross such ethnic boundaries, especially in the case of real or perceived threats.
Prisoners have also, consciously or unconsciously depending upon the case, capitalised upon Islam to reform links with family, or to reduce the impact that the lack of family contact has on their lives. In the case of female Muslim prisoners, the majority of whom are mothers, separation from children adds a great burden to their imprisonment. Through rediscovering or converting to Islam, some of the female prisoners I met wished to express their intention of becoming ‘good mothers’ or ‘good examples’ for their children. Islam has surely helped these women, as also the young offenders, to socialise and to survive the process of adaptation to prison.
My research has highlighted serious problems of discrimination based mainly upon religious and political victimisation. Adopting visibly religious behavior or converting to Islam can mean an increase in distrust from some sectors of the prison and especially from fellow inmates. This has, as we have seen, a serious impact on how Islam, as religion, is understood and practiced within prison and this increases the risk of certain radical groups exploiting former Muslim prisoners’ resentment.
However, mostly concealed from the eyes of both prison authorities and scholars is the Muslim-to-Muslim bullying that affects some prisons. I have, among the other forms of bullying, discussed the often-unheard case of Shi‘a Muslim prisoners. Although few in number, these prisoners suffer not only from the same problems as any other prisoner, but also from in-group discrimination and bullying – especially since the majority of Muslim prisoners are Sunni and the Prison Service employs Sunni imams and, though indirectly, ‘sponsors’ Sunni Islam.
In Chapter 5, starting from Damasio’s distinction between emotions and feelings, I have explained how feelings are essential to maintain an autobiographical-self and that what we call ‘faith’ is part of such a process. The most common emotion found in prison is certainly fear, which of course induces powerful feelings.Faith can be experienced in different ways, and I have suggested that the emotion of fear, so common among prisoners, has facilitated the experience of ‘wonder’ for some. It is through wonder that some Muslim prisoners rediscover Islam. However, many more, through the shocking experience of prison, rediscover Islam through a cognitive opening that, as discussed in Chapter 6.
In Chapter 5, I have also demonstrated how social restrictions, the forced contact with others and the need to control a challenging environment facilitate simplifications, so that stereotypes, as dualistic thinking, are extremely common. I have then explained how this common way of making sense of reality can, in certain circumstances, become particularly radical. Radical dualism is dogmatic and aggressive in its expression. I have discussed how this forma mentis can develop without an actual indoctrination or external influence, such as radical literature or other material.
The question of whether Muslim prisoners are radicalising in prison is one that journalists, politicians, the police and the Prison Services have asked during my research. As I have explained in the Introduction, the question in itself has little meaning because it demands a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. The reason for this may be found in the widespread idea that ‘extremism’, fundamentalism’ and ‘radicalism’ are a sort of virus that can infect and spread. The etiology and the epidemiology are also simple: this ‘virus’ spreads through exposure to cultural objects (books, cassettes with sermons, pamphlets and so forth) and ideas transmitted by the various ‘carriers’. Although cultural objects and ideas may play a role, this is, contrary to expectations, secondary. Indeed, ‘radicalisation’ is a process, not a ‘virus’.
As with any processes, several variables are at stake and I have analyzed them in Chapter 6 I have discussed how some Muslim prisoners develop during their incarceration, as a reaction to the prison environment and the perception that they are victims of social injustice, what I have called a ‘feeling of dignity’ and an ‘ethos of justice’.Indeed, as Toch (2003) has explained, all prisoners, to preserve their identity, in one way or another reject their presence in prison as unjust. In the case of some Muslim prisoners (though certainly not the majority), this also means to reject the ‘authority’ of the prison over them. All Muslim prisoners, of course, consider themselves to be Allah’s slaves.
However, some extend this reasoning beyond the theological domain and conclude that they have only one master, Allah, and thus reject any human authority, including that of the prison imam. Indeed, they would argue that since authority within prison is based on human rules for the benefi t of humans, it is ‘a-moral’ and should be rejected. Therefore, tawhid, the main pillar of Islam declaring the oneness of God and the essence of faith for any Muslim, is here transformed from a theological tenet into an ideological tool of survival and a mechanism of maintaining one’s own autobiographical-self and sense of dignity.
The ideology of tawhid is the result, in this case, of prison dynamics rather than indoctrination or reading material. It is also interesting to note that, in a majority of cases, it was not the most vulnerable of prisoners to adopt an ideology of tawhid, but rather those whose expectations of how they should be treated (especially in reference to their religious identity) were most violated by the prison environment. It is the contradiction, between a prisoner’s expectations and the reality of prison that nourishes the ‘defensive’ mechanism that I have referred to as the ideology of tawhid.
In Chapter 6, I shall explain that an ideology of tawhid can become part of a more complex process: the shift from a doctrinal mode of Islamic religiosity to an imagistic one. Whitehouse (2004) has explained religious transmission through a cognitive theory known as ‘modes of religiosity’. Doctrinal modes of religiosity, such as the main monotheistic religions, are based upon repetition in their rituals and are structured around complex theological teachings that induce a low level of arousal.
By contrast, religions based on an imagistic mode (e.g. some African tribal religions or Cargo rituals in Papua New Guinea) have a low transmissive frequency, a high level of arousal and are based on episodic memory, meaning in this case that the meaning of rituals are derived from personal, and often traumatic, experiences (e.g. initiations). Surely, even for those who have been in prison before, imprisonment is a distressing event marked by several, more or less traumatic, rituals.
In some cases this facilitates not only cognitive openings as discussed in Chapter 5, but also spontaneous exegetical reflection in which the individual is able to extrapolate, as an effect of episodic memory, meaningful personal eschatology which however, as far as Islam is concerned, can antagonise the orthodox doctrinal mode of Islamic religiosity.
An imagistic mode of religiosity may not only display characteristics that others might define as ‘fanaticism’ or ‘extremism’, but because of its particular nature, it may also incline towards violence. Imams, including the prison imam, are used to operating within the ‘doctrinal mode’ and the Prison Service tends to sponsor an even more ‘orthodox’, controlled and structured version of Islam than what exists outside.
As discussed in the Introduction, unfortunately instead of taking the right steps to modify those elements that can facilitate the development of an imagistic mode of Islamic religiosity in prison, the English and Welsh Prison Service is employing counterproductive security policies. The British government, with plans such as that of isolating some Muslim prisoners in special prisons, can provide an even more fertile ground for new and more powerful imagistic modes of Islamic religiosity.
In Chapter 7, we follow the post-incarceration experiences of some of my respondents. While the government, and consequently the Prison Service, displays ardent concern about security and extremism within prison, the destiny of former Muslim prisoners seems to be of no interest, and this indifference has possible unfortunate consequences. Indeed, if the effects of the prison environment and the related issues we have discussed in this book are to become a potential threat, it will be so outside prison rather than in it.
Of course, the danger is limited, as I have explained, but as we also know, it takes only a few committed individuals to endanger the lives of many. Former Muslim prisoners lacking much needed support from relatives or the State will rarely find it within their own Muslim community, which today, as my research has shown, is still prone to reject them rather than address their needs. However, other groups, politicised and radical in their interpretation of Islam, are likely to sometimes offer what the mainstream community and the State fail to provide.
Though many of the Muslim prisoners who enter radical organisations voluntarily, by chance, or because of being actively recruited, later go on to reject them. Yet a small number, depending upon their experience of prison, how they developed their ‘prison Islam’ and the degree of isolation they endured, may join and possibly even be persuaded to commit worse crimes than before, including terrorism.
This book attempts to demonstrate that the high rate of Muslims detained is a clear result of political failure to address those socioeconomic and educational problems that an increasing number of young Muslims face. The increasingly common trend of adducing the disadvantaged condition of many UK Muslims to ‘Islam’ and ‘Islamic culture’ only adds to distrust of political power.
Muslims are integrated – but of course, they are integrated within the poorest and most disadvantaged suburbs in the nation. More Muslims, if problems are not addressed (or continue to be addressed through patronizing instead of empowering means), will end in prison. As this book strongly reaffirms, Muslim prisoners are human beings and are thus affected by the environment, in this case prison, through emotions.
I have tried to make explicit the dynamics that exist within prison as far as Islam is concerned, and today, indeed, we can speak of the existence of a ‘prison Islam’. Some of the processes, such as faith, ideology and fear, are inevitable in prison – and not just in the case of Muslim prisoners – but they can be understood and managed in a positive way. I hope that this book may contribute to such a challenging aim.
I am pleased to inform you that my book ‘Faith, Ideology, and Fear: Muslim Identities Within and Beyond Prisons‘, published by Continuum, is now available. This book is based on my 4-year-research both within UK prisons as well as outside them. I have written about the research itself before. You can find the book both in bookstores as well as Internet sellers such as
as many academic books today, the publisher has decided to issue first the hardback and consider a paperback only in the case that, after one year, the book has sold enough. So, if you are interested in reading it, and you cannot afford the price, ask the librarian at your university or public library to acquire it (there is also an electronic copy which is cheeper). Below I shall offer a summary of the chapters. If you wish, you can read the full Introduction on my personal website.
In this book I have aimed to offer an understanding of the reasons for which today more Muslims are detained in prison (Chapter 3); how Muslim prisoners experience prison (Chapter 4); how such experience influences their ‘making sense’ of Islam in prison, and the consequent development of a prison Islam (Chapter 5); the process through which some Muslim prisoners may adhere to unorthodox and emotional interpretations of Islam that are based on spontaneous exegetical reflections (Chapter 6); and finally the difficulties, isolation and the lack of support that former Muslim prisoners experience and the risks that they, and consequently our societies, may face as far as reoffending and terrorism are concerned (Chapter 7).
In Chapter 2 I have discussed the risk involved in solely focusing on religion, seen as a powerful cultural system of symbols. In this book, I have adopted a different view, and as an anthropologist advocating in my work that anthropology must rediscover the ‘anthropos’, and suggested that we should start not from Islam (or even ethnicity or culture), but rather from those individuals whom I have met, interacted with, observed and tried to understand. They are not symbols or made by symbols. They have bones, flesh, veins and brains. They are alive and interact with not only others but also the surrounding environment, and are thus affected by it. They can laugh, cry, blush, or display many other emotions, consciously or unconsciously, remember events and express their identities.
For this reason, in this book we will start our journey outside prison (Chapter 3) by discussing the difficult socio-economic, yet also emotional, environment in which many Muslims in the United Kingdom, live today. Geographically, Muslim communities tend to live in the most deprived areas of the most densely populated cities in the United Kingdom. Although reading prison statistics may give the impression that there exists an increase of ‘Muslim crimes’, in reality an attentive comparative statistical approach reveals that the higher proportion of Muslims incarcerated are the result of independent, rather than dependent, variables.
As I have explained in Chapter 3, Muslims in the United Kingdom have a young population, and criminological research has demonstrated that the young age of a population has a great impact upon offenses and incarceration rates . Leaving aside national statistics concerning Muslims in prison and examining some British locations in which the Muslim and non-Muslim population are nearly equal, we may observe that the imprisonment rate (see Chapter 3) is virtually the same for both the groups. Therefore, we can only reject suggestions, such as that which Macey (2002) proposed, that ‘believing in Islam’ exposes Muslims to social and economic disadvantage as well as increases the risk of their committing crimes.
In reality, as I have explained in Chapter 3, British Muslims born of Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Indian or Arab origins are, despite numerous political and journalistic claims, ‘integrating’ within British society. Integration is local, and in many cases this means that these young people integrate into troubled areas which are affected by drugs, gang culture, prostitution and so forth. Difficult urban spaces have an impact upon the levels of criminal behaviour among the general population. Muslims tend, however, to be more vulnerable because of the rejection that they often receive from mainstream society because of their ethnic, or religious, identities.
In Chapter 4, we start to observe the lives of Muslim prisoners from their first steps inside. As in the rest of this book, we observe them as human beings, whom in this case ‘feel to be Muslims’ (Marranci 2008). The prison environment affects them in the same way that it would any other person, as many elements of psychology, emotions and neurocognitive factors are universal. For this reason, in Chapter 4, I have first discussed the process of adaptation to prison and the difficulties involved.
I have explained how Islamic rituals and practices acquire an extra layer of meaning that helps Muslim prisoners to survive within the prison environment as well as manage psychological changes. Many variables affect the relationship between prisoners, and ethnicity is surely one of the most powerful. Yet we have noticed that Islam has been used by prisoners to cross such ethnic boundaries, especially in the case of real or perceived threats.
Prisoners have also, consciously or unconsciously depending upon the case, capitalised upon Islam to reform links with family, or to reduce the impact that the lack of family contact has on their lives. In the case of female Muslim prisoners, the majority of whom are mothers, separation from children adds a great burden to their imprisonment. Through rediscovering or converting to Islam, some of the female prisoners I met wished to express their intention of becoming ‘good mothers’ or ‘good examples’ for their children. Islam has surely helped these women, as also the young offenders, to socialise and to survive the process of adaptation to prison.
My research has highlighted serious problems of discrimination based mainly upon religious and political victimisation. Adopting visibly religious behavior or converting to Islam can mean an increase in distrust from some sectors of the prison and especially from fellow inmates. This has, as we have seen, a serious impact on how Islam, as religion, is understood and practiced within prison and this increases the risk of certain radical groups exploiting former Muslim prisoners’ resentment.
However, mostly concealed from the eyes of both prison authorities and scholars is the Muslim-to-Muslim bullying that affects some prisons. I have, among the other forms of bullying, discussed the often-unheard case of Shi‘a Muslim prisoners. Although few in number, these prisoners suffer not only from the same problems as any other prisoner, but also from in-group discrimination and bullying – especially since the majority of Muslim prisoners are Sunni and the Prison Service employs Sunni imams and, though indirectly, ‘sponsors’ Sunni Islam.
In Chapter 5, starting from Damasio’s distinction between emotions and feelings, I have explained how feelings are essential to maintain an autobiographical-self and that what we call ‘faith’ is part of such a process. The most common emotion found in prison is certainly fear, which of course induces powerful feelings.Faith can be experienced in different ways, and I have suggested that the emotion of fear, so common among prisoners, has facilitated the experience of ‘wonder’ for some. It is through wonder that some Muslim prisoners rediscover Islam. However, many more, through the shocking experience of prison, rediscover Islam through a cognitive opening that, as discussed in Chapter 6.
In Chapter 5, I have also demonstrated how social restrictions, the forced contact with others and the need to control a challenging environment facilitate simplifications, so that stereotypes, as dualistic thinking, are extremely common. I have then explained how this common way of making sense of reality can, in certain circumstances, become particularly radical. Radical dualism is dogmatic and aggressive in its expression. I have discussed how this forma mentis can develop without an actual indoctrination or external influence, such as radical literature or other material.
The question of whether Muslim prisoners are radicalising in prison is one that journalists, politicians, the police and the Prison Services have asked during my research. As I have explained in the Introduction, the question in itself has little meaning because it demands a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. The reason for this may be found in the widespread idea that ‘extremism’, fundamentalism’ and ‘radicalism’ are a sort of virus that can infect and spread. The etiology and the epidemiology are also simple: this ‘virus’ spreads through exposure to cultural objects (books, cassettes with sermons, pamphlets and so forth) and ideas transmitted by the various ‘carriers’. Although cultural objects and ideas may play a role, this is, contrary to expectations, secondary. Indeed, ‘radicalisation’ is a process, not a ‘virus’.
As with any processes, several variables are at stake and I have analyzed them in Chapter 6 I have discussed how some Muslim prisoners develop during their incarceration, as a reaction to the prison environment and the perception that they are victims of social injustice, what I have called a ‘feeling of dignity’ and an ‘ethos of justice’.Indeed, as Toch (2003) has explained, all prisoners, to preserve their identity, in one way or another reject their presence in prison as unjust. In the case of some Muslim prisoners (though certainly not the majority), this also means to reject the ‘authority’ of the prison over them. All Muslim prisoners, of course, consider themselves to be Allah’s slaves.
However, some extend this reasoning beyond the theological domain and conclude that they have only one master, Allah, and thus reject any human authority, including that of the prison imam. Indeed, they would argue that since authority within prison is based on human rules for the benefi t of humans, it is ‘a-moral’ and should be rejected. Therefore, tawhid, the main pillar of Islam declaring the oneness of God and the essence of faith for any Muslim, is here transformed from a theological tenet into an ideological tool of survival and a mechanism of maintaining one’s own autobiographical-self and sense of dignity.
The ideology of tawhid is the result, in this case, of prison dynamics rather than indoctrination or reading material. It is also interesting to note that, in a majority of cases, it was not the most vulnerable of prisoners to adopt an ideology of tawhid, but rather those whose expectations of how they should be treated (especially in reference to their religious identity) were most violated by the prison environment. It is the contradiction, between a prisoner’s expectations and the reality of prison that nourishes the ‘defensive’ mechanism that I have referred to as the ideology of tawhid.
In Chapter 6, I shall explain that an ideology of tawhid can become part of a more complex process: the shift from a doctrinal mode of Islamic religiosity to an imagistic one. Whitehouse (2004) has explained religious transmission through a cognitive theory known as ‘modes of religiosity’. Doctrinal modes of religiosity, such as the main monotheistic religions, are based upon repetition in their rituals and are structured around complex theological teachings that induce a low level of arousal.
By contrast, religions based on an imagistic mode (e.g. some African tribal religions or Cargo rituals in Papua New Guinea) have a low transmissive frequency, a high level of arousal and are based on episodic memory, meaning in this case that the meaning of rituals are derived from personal, and often traumatic, experiences (e.g. initiations). Surely, even for those who have been in prison before, imprisonment is a distressing event marked by several, more or less traumatic, rituals.
In some cases this facilitates not only cognitive openings as discussed in Chapter 5, but also spontaneous exegetical reflection in which the individual is able to extrapolate, as an effect of episodic memory, meaningful personal eschatology which however, as far as Islam is concerned, can antagonise the orthodox doctrinal mode of Islamic religiosity.
An imagistic mode of religiosity may not only display characteristics that others might define as ‘fanaticism’ or ‘extremism’, but because of its particular nature, it may also incline towards violence. Imams, including the prison imam, are used to operating within the ‘doctrinal mode’ and the Prison Service tends to sponsor an even more ‘orthodox’, controlled and structured version of Islam than what exists outside.
As discussed in the Introduction, unfortunately instead of taking the right steps to modify those elements that can facilitate the development of an imagistic mode of Islamic religiosity in prison, the English and Welsh Prison Service is employing counterproductive security policies. The British government, with plans such as that of isolating some Muslim prisoners in special prisons, can provide an even more fertile ground for new and more powerful imagistic modes of Islamic religiosity.
In Chapter 7, we follow the post-incarceration experiences of some of my respondents. While the government, and consequently the Prison Service, displays ardent concern about security and extremism within prison, the destiny of former Muslim prisoners seems to be of no interest, and this indifference has possible unfortunate consequences. Indeed, if the effects of the prison environment and the related issues we have discussed in this book are to become a potential threat, it will be so outside prison rather than in it.
Of course, the danger is limited, as I have explained, but as we also know, it takes only a few committed individuals to endanger the lives of many. Former Muslim prisoners lacking much needed support from relatives or the State will rarely find it within their own Muslim community, which today, as my research has shown, is still prone to reject them rather than address their needs. However, other groups, politicised and radical in their interpretation of Islam, are likely to sometimes offer what the mainstream community and the State fail to provide.
Though many of the Muslim prisoners who enter radical organisations voluntarily, by chance, or because of being actively recruited, later go on to reject them. Yet a small number, depending upon their experience of prison, how they developed their ‘prison Islam’ and the degree of isolation they endured, may join and possibly even be persuaded to commit worse crimes than before, including terrorism.
This book attempts to demonstrate that the high rate of Muslims detained is a clear result of political failure to address those socioeconomic and educational problems that an increasing number of young Muslims face. The increasingly common trend of adducing the disadvantaged condition of many UK Muslims to ‘Islam’ and ‘Islamic culture’ only adds to distrust of political power.
Muslims are integrated – but of course, they are integrated within the poorest and most disadvantaged suburbs in the nation. More Muslims, if problems are not addressed (or continue to be addressed through patronizing instead of empowering means), will end in prison. As this book strongly reaffirms, Muslim prisoners are human beings and are thus affected by the environment, in this case prison, through emotions.
I have tried to make explicit the dynamics that exist within prison as far as Islam is concerned, and today, indeed, we can speak of the existence of a ‘prison Islam’. Some of the processes, such as faith, ideology and fear, are inevitable in prison – and not just in the case of Muslim prisoners – but they can be understood and managed in a positive way. I hope that this book may contribute to such a challenging aim.
Re: LAS PECULIARIDADES DEL ISLAM EN PRISIÓN
Una recopilación de bibliografía sobre reclutamiento en las prisiones. Es de la Biblioteca de la Academia del FBI de Quantico. El enlace es:http://fbilibrary.fbiacademy.edu/biblio ... prison.htm
La verdad es que cada vez es más difícil encontrar bibliografía que no tenga ya un par de años. Los temas decaen y pasan a un segundo plano con una rapidez que impresiona.
La verdad es que cada vez es más difícil encontrar bibliografía que no tenga ya un par de años. Los temas decaen y pasan a un segundo plano con una rapidez que impresiona.
Re: LAS PECULIARIDADES DEL ISLAM EN PRISIÓN
LA INSPECTORA JEFE DE LAS PRISIONES DE INGLATERRA Y GALES NO CREE QUE EL AVANCE DEL RADICALISMO EN LAS PRISIONES SEA PREOCUPANTE
Manifiesta que la generalización del colectivo musulmán en prisión como un colectivo susceptible de radicalización, sin distinguir casos individuales es contraproducente. Los musulmanes suponen un 12 por ciento de la población penitenciaria si bien sólo el 1 por ciento de los reclusos musulmanes tiene relación con el terrorismo. Además se considera el colectivo como muy variado ya que incluye a los conversos además de a los nacidos musulmanes. Más preocupante es el hecho de que la mayor parte de los musulmanes pertenecen a minorías étnicas y a que en ocasiones su conversión o su mayor religiosidad se basa en buscar protección en un grupo y la disciplina personal que el Islam otorga al creyente. Son en todo caso elementos que facilitan un proceso de radicalización.
Aquí os dejo el artículo de THE GUARDIAN
Muslim prisoners 'treated as potential terrorists'Attitude risks creating extremism, watchdog warns amid scepticism over claims of forced conversion to Islam
(20)Tweet this (38)Alan Travis, home affairs editor The Guardian, Tuesday 8 June 2010 Article history
Brixton prison. Photograph: Martin Godwin
The blanket treatment by staff of the 10,300 Muslim prisoners in England and Wales as potential terrorists risks creating young men ready to embrace extremism on their release, the chief inspector of prisons warns today.
Dame Anne Owers says the treatment of the rapidly growing population of Muslim prisoners as potential or actual extremists is prevalent throughout the prison system despite the fact that fewer than 1% are in prison for terrorist-related offences.
The chief inspector also voices scepticism over claims by high security prison staff that gangs are forcing non-Muslim prisoners to convert to Islam through intimidation. Her report says that while conversions are common they are more likely to be the result of better food at Ramadan, the benefits of protection within a group and the discipline and structure provided by observing Islam through prayer.
The report, published today, is based on interviews with 164 Muslim prisoners in eight prisons and young offender institutions, combined with prisoner surveys and inspection reports over the past three years. The number of Muslims in prison in England and Wales has soared in recent years from 2,513, or 5% of the prison population, in 1994 to 6,571 or 8% in 2004 and to 10,300, more than 12%, on the latest figures.
"There has been considerable public focus on them as potential extremists and on prisons as the place where they may become radicalised, often through conversion – even though fewer than 1% are in prison for terrorist-related offences," says the chief inspector's report.
But Owers says they are a far from homogenous group: "Some are birth Muslims, and others have converted. In prisoner surveys, 40% were Asian, 32% black, 11% white and 10% of mixed heritage. One of their main grievances was, however, that staff tended to think of them as a group, rather than as individuals, and too often through the lens of extremism and terrorism – whether that was to prevent, or detect, those issues."
The chief inspector says the main finding from the surveys and interviews was that Muslim prisoners report more negatively on their prison experience, and particularly their safety and relationships with staff, than other prisoners. The problem was most acute in high security prisons where three-quarters of Muslims interviewed said they felt unsafe, which was strongly linked to mistrust of the staff.
The one positive finding of the report was that the strengthening network of Muslim chaplains meant that Muslim prisoners are now more likely to have their faith needs met than other prisoners.
Owers says a "pervasive theme" of their interviews and reports was the lack of support and training provided to staff outside of briefings that related to violent extremism and radicalisation.
"It would be naive to deny that there are, within the prison population, Muslims who hold radical extremist views, or who may be attracted to them for a variety of reasons. But that does not argue for a blanket security-led approach to Muslim prisoners in general," said the chief inspector.
Owers says that without effective staff engagement with Muslims as individual prisoners "there is a real risk of a self-fulfilling prophesy: that the prison experience will create or entrench alienation and disaffection, so that prisons release into the community young men who are more likely to offend, or even embrace extremism."
Manifiesta que la generalización del colectivo musulmán en prisión como un colectivo susceptible de radicalización, sin distinguir casos individuales es contraproducente. Los musulmanes suponen un 12 por ciento de la población penitenciaria si bien sólo el 1 por ciento de los reclusos musulmanes tiene relación con el terrorismo. Además se considera el colectivo como muy variado ya que incluye a los conversos además de a los nacidos musulmanes. Más preocupante es el hecho de que la mayor parte de los musulmanes pertenecen a minorías étnicas y a que en ocasiones su conversión o su mayor religiosidad se basa en buscar protección en un grupo y la disciplina personal que el Islam otorga al creyente. Son en todo caso elementos que facilitan un proceso de radicalización.
Aquí os dejo el artículo de THE GUARDIAN
Muslim prisoners 'treated as potential terrorists'Attitude risks creating extremism, watchdog warns amid scepticism over claims of forced conversion to Islam
(20)Tweet this (38)Alan Travis, home affairs editor The Guardian, Tuesday 8 June 2010 Article history
Brixton prison. Photograph: Martin Godwin
The blanket treatment by staff of the 10,300 Muslim prisoners in England and Wales as potential terrorists risks creating young men ready to embrace extremism on their release, the chief inspector of prisons warns today.
Dame Anne Owers says the treatment of the rapidly growing population of Muslim prisoners as potential or actual extremists is prevalent throughout the prison system despite the fact that fewer than 1% are in prison for terrorist-related offences.
The chief inspector also voices scepticism over claims by high security prison staff that gangs are forcing non-Muslim prisoners to convert to Islam through intimidation. Her report says that while conversions are common they are more likely to be the result of better food at Ramadan, the benefits of protection within a group and the discipline and structure provided by observing Islam through prayer.
The report, published today, is based on interviews with 164 Muslim prisoners in eight prisons and young offender institutions, combined with prisoner surveys and inspection reports over the past three years. The number of Muslims in prison in England and Wales has soared in recent years from 2,513, or 5% of the prison population, in 1994 to 6,571 or 8% in 2004 and to 10,300, more than 12%, on the latest figures.
"There has been considerable public focus on them as potential extremists and on prisons as the place where they may become radicalised, often through conversion – even though fewer than 1% are in prison for terrorist-related offences," says the chief inspector's report.
But Owers says they are a far from homogenous group: "Some are birth Muslims, and others have converted. In prisoner surveys, 40% were Asian, 32% black, 11% white and 10% of mixed heritage. One of their main grievances was, however, that staff tended to think of them as a group, rather than as individuals, and too often through the lens of extremism and terrorism – whether that was to prevent, or detect, those issues."
The chief inspector says the main finding from the surveys and interviews was that Muslim prisoners report more negatively on their prison experience, and particularly their safety and relationships with staff, than other prisoners. The problem was most acute in high security prisons where three-quarters of Muslims interviewed said they felt unsafe, which was strongly linked to mistrust of the staff.
The one positive finding of the report was that the strengthening network of Muslim chaplains meant that Muslim prisoners are now more likely to have their faith needs met than other prisoners.
Owers says a "pervasive theme" of their interviews and reports was the lack of support and training provided to staff outside of briefings that related to violent extremism and radicalisation.
"It would be naive to deny that there are, within the prison population, Muslims who hold radical extremist views, or who may be attracted to them for a variety of reasons. But that does not argue for a blanket security-led approach to Muslim prisoners in general," said the chief inspector.
Owers says that without effective staff engagement with Muslims as individual prisoners "there is a real risk of a self-fulfilling prophesy: that the prison experience will create or entrench alienation and disaffection, so that prisons release into the community young men who are more likely to offend, or even embrace extremism."
Re: LAS PECULIARIDADES DEL ISLAM EN PRISIÓN
Un artículo del diario The Guardian sobre radicalización en las prisiones británicas. Curioso el cálculo de porcentajes sobre el riesgo de caer en extremismos
Terror warning over radicalised prisonersUp to 800 'potentially violent radicals' could be released from prisons in next five to 10 years, says thinktank
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2010/ ... or-warning
Britain faces a potential "new wave" of home-grown terrorist attacks as a result of an escalating rate of radicalisation of Muslims inside the prison system, according to a report published today by a leading defence and security thinktank.
The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) says that up to 800 "potentially violent radicals" who have not been convicted of terrorist offences could be released from prisons in England and Wales over the next five to 10 years and will pose a significant challenge to the security services to identify them.
The estimate rests upon "prison probation sources" saying that one in 10 of the 8,000 Muslim prisoners in high security jails in England and Wales could be successfully targeted.
However, the Ministry of Justice disputed the figures in the report. It said last night: "The prison and probation service does not recognise the figure of 800 'violent radicals' referred to in the report, nor do we agree that jihadist radicalisation is taking place at a rapid rate.
"There are only 6,000 prisoners in the high security estate, most of whom are not Muslim. The figure of 'one in 10 of the 8,000 Muslims' in the high security estate is therefore unrecognisable."
The report by Michael Clarke, the institute's director, and Valentina Soria says that the prisoners are potential recruits for a "new wave" of terrorism likely to involve a shift in tactics. They predict a move away from large-scale, co-ordinated bombings, which have needed considerable training and operational support, to the greater use of lone individuals carrying out smaller-scale random attacks against different targets.
"The spectre of terrorist attacks has receded from the public mind for the time being, yet more than any other country, the UK has the greatest to fear from home-grown terrorism," says their report. "Certainly, British security services are acutely aware of the possibilities for a wave of individual random attacks against different targets. Attacks on 'crowded places' are near the top of the government's risk rankings over the next five years."
The report raises particular concerns about what is going on inside Britain's prison system. It stresses that only 23 of the 230 people convicted on terrorism or terrorism-related offences as a result of the first wave of jihadist attacks against Britain since 9/11 are currently serving life or indeterminate sentences. More than a third were sentenced to between eight months and four years as they were convicted of less serious non-terrorist charges and are now being released or are soon to be released. Probation sources confirmed to the Guardian yesterday that they expected the number of such prisoners who have been released to pass the 100 mark next April. They said that six had already been recalled to prison for further offences, including one who had been trying to get hold of a gun.
The RUSI report argues that the experience of Northern Ireland shows it is more likely that the majority of those will remain committed to their cause and may serve as a source of motivation to others, albeit in clandestine ways. It says there is evidence of jihadist radicalisation taking place at a rapid rate, especially within the eight high-security prisons.
Clarke and Soria suggest that the emergence of new al-Qaida leaders such as Anwar al-Awlaki demonstrates an increase in the use of more individuals, carrying out attacks on a smaller scale. This new breed of jihadists have only tenuous links to any major terrorist organisation and receive little training and few resources, increasing the difficulty for the police and intelligence services in tracking and intercepting them.
RUSI said last night it stood by its 800 estimate but accepted the figure of 8,000 Muslim prisoners was across the prison system, not for those just in high security jails.
The justice ministry said the holding of extremist views and the process of radicalisation were found in wider society, not just jails. "The presumption that holding radical or extreme views necessarily leads to violent extremist behaviour and criminality should be challenged. All our high security prisons operate enhanced monitoring and intelligence-gathering on those convicted or suspected of involvement in terrorism or extremism, and staff are trained to recognise and deal with behaviours which are of concern," it said.
The ministry added that a dedicated expert unit within the Prison Service existed to tackle the risk of radicalisation posed by those offenders with violent extremist views, and those who might attempt to improperly influence others.
Terror warning over radicalised prisonersUp to 800 'potentially violent radicals' could be released from prisons in next five to 10 years, says thinktank
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2010/ ... or-warning
Britain faces a potential "new wave" of home-grown terrorist attacks as a result of an escalating rate of radicalisation of Muslims inside the prison system, according to a report published today by a leading defence and security thinktank.
The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) says that up to 800 "potentially violent radicals" who have not been convicted of terrorist offences could be released from prisons in England and Wales over the next five to 10 years and will pose a significant challenge to the security services to identify them.
The estimate rests upon "prison probation sources" saying that one in 10 of the 8,000 Muslim prisoners in high security jails in England and Wales could be successfully targeted.
However, the Ministry of Justice disputed the figures in the report. It said last night: "The prison and probation service does not recognise the figure of 800 'violent radicals' referred to in the report, nor do we agree that jihadist radicalisation is taking place at a rapid rate.
"There are only 6,000 prisoners in the high security estate, most of whom are not Muslim. The figure of 'one in 10 of the 8,000 Muslims' in the high security estate is therefore unrecognisable."
The report by Michael Clarke, the institute's director, and Valentina Soria says that the prisoners are potential recruits for a "new wave" of terrorism likely to involve a shift in tactics. They predict a move away from large-scale, co-ordinated bombings, which have needed considerable training and operational support, to the greater use of lone individuals carrying out smaller-scale random attacks against different targets.
"The spectre of terrorist attacks has receded from the public mind for the time being, yet more than any other country, the UK has the greatest to fear from home-grown terrorism," says their report. "Certainly, British security services are acutely aware of the possibilities for a wave of individual random attacks against different targets. Attacks on 'crowded places' are near the top of the government's risk rankings over the next five years."
The report raises particular concerns about what is going on inside Britain's prison system. It stresses that only 23 of the 230 people convicted on terrorism or terrorism-related offences as a result of the first wave of jihadist attacks against Britain since 9/11 are currently serving life or indeterminate sentences. More than a third were sentenced to between eight months and four years as they were convicted of less serious non-terrorist charges and are now being released or are soon to be released. Probation sources confirmed to the Guardian yesterday that they expected the number of such prisoners who have been released to pass the 100 mark next April. They said that six had already been recalled to prison for further offences, including one who had been trying to get hold of a gun.
The RUSI report argues that the experience of Northern Ireland shows it is more likely that the majority of those will remain committed to their cause and may serve as a source of motivation to others, albeit in clandestine ways. It says there is evidence of jihadist radicalisation taking place at a rapid rate, especially within the eight high-security prisons.
Clarke and Soria suggest that the emergence of new al-Qaida leaders such as Anwar al-Awlaki demonstrates an increase in the use of more individuals, carrying out attacks on a smaller scale. This new breed of jihadists have only tenuous links to any major terrorist organisation and receive little training and few resources, increasing the difficulty for the police and intelligence services in tracking and intercepting them.
RUSI said last night it stood by its 800 estimate but accepted the figure of 8,000 Muslim prisoners was across the prison system, not for those just in high security jails.
The justice ministry said the holding of extremist views and the process of radicalisation were found in wider society, not just jails. "The presumption that holding radical or extreme views necessarily leads to violent extremist behaviour and criminality should be challenged. All our high security prisons operate enhanced monitoring and intelligence-gathering on those convicted or suspected of involvement in terrorism or extremism, and staff are trained to recognise and deal with behaviours which are of concern," it said.
The ministry added that a dedicated expert unit within the Prison Service existed to tackle the risk of radicalisation posed by those offenders with violent extremist views, and those who might attempt to improperly influence others.
Re: LAS PECULIARIDADES DEL ISLAM EN PRISIÓN
Un enlace interesante. Organización y reclutamiento en las prisiones. http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/ctc082002.pdf
Nada nuevo bajo el sol, pero ayuda ver las ideas sistematizadas
Nada nuevo bajo el sol, pero ayuda ver las ideas sistematizadas
Re: LAS PECULIARIDADES DEL ISLAM EN PRISIÓN
Un artículo sobre la aplicación del principio del Zakat, al ámbito de las prisiones. Se titula El Zakat y la olvidada obligación islámica hacia los presos El enlace es:http://www.cageprisoners.com/our-work/o ... -prisoners
Hace referencia a una obligación de la que se ocupan muy pocas organizaciones. En Reino UNido es algo más frecuente. Como lo de- muestra la propia organización "Cage the prisoners"
Hace referencia a una obligación de la que se ocupan muy pocas organizaciones. En Reino UNido es algo más frecuente. Como lo de- muestra la propia organización "Cage the prisoners"